Why are chiefs recognised in South Africa's new democracy? Issues of legitimacy and contestation in local politics: a case study of chiefly and local government in Vaaltyn by Skosana, Dineo Ephodia
1 
 
Why are chiefs recognised in South Africa’s new democracy? Issues of legitimacy 
and contestation in local politics: A case study of chiefly and local government in 
Vaaltyn 
 
Dineo Ephodia Skosana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts 
by Dissertation. 
Johannesburg, 2012  
 
2 
 
Declaration 
 
 
I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It is submitted for the Degree of 
Master of Arts in Political Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. 
It has not been submitted before for any other degree or examination at any other 
university.  
 
 
Dineo Ephodia Skosana 
 
 
March 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the legitimacy of chiefs in post-apartheid South Africa through the 
prism of the Vaaltyn Mokopane chieftainship in Limpopo Province. It is used as a case 
study to understand how chiefs gain and maintain legitimacy. This is studied within a  
framework of a succession dispute between two candidates, Vaaltyn A (born in 1964) 
and Vaaltyn B (born in 1974). The claim of Vaaltyn B was legitimized by the local 
government of Mokopane and the provincial government of Limpopo, irrespective of 
the fact that that majority of the Kekana tribal council and the community members 
supported Vaaltyn A. The thesis suggests that the legitimacy of chief Vaaltyn B is 
maintained through patron-client relations in which the local/provincial government 
enters into and initiates economically viable relations with Vaaltyn B and mining 
houses. These patron-client relations are formed and continued within a context of a 
succession dispute which allows for Vaaltyn A and community members to be sidelined. 
Finally, the thesis discusses where the legitimization of chief Vaaltyn B by the people 
stands, in this case where authority has already been awarded by the government. This 
serves as a platform to probe whether people continue to support the continuing 
existence of chiefs in a democratic dispensation.  
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Chapter 1  
  
Introduction 
Regardless of the contested history of traditional leaders, they have remained a 
conspicuous feature of post-apartheid South Africa. It is the aim of this research to 
understand why it is that even though democratic structures and democratically elected 
leaders have been set in place, the traditional form of governance remains salient. The 
thesis addresses the question about who legitimizes the chief. Vaaltyn in Mokopane 
(Limpopo) is used as a case study to understand one group of people’s perceptions 
about chieftainship. This thesis is written within a context of a succession dispute 
between two candidates, Vaaltyn A and Vaaltyn B, who both belong to the Kekana 
chiefly lineage. The resolution to the dispute paves the way for Vaaltyn B who is now 
chief, to secure recognition from the democratic government. State recognition offers a 
platform for the recognized chief and his tribal council members to enter into economic 
deals and politically binding decisions, without consulting the unrecognized faction or 
the villagers.  
This thesis shows how patronage networks and negotiated agreements between the 
chief, the local and the provincial government and the Platinum Reef Resource mine, 
maintain his authority. In turn these patron-client networks and the decisions taken 
within these networks isolate him from his subjects and the contending faction. 
Therefore, the study considers the extent to which people support chief Vaaltyn B and 
the impact these patronage networks have in the area. The research findings indicate 
that people of Mokopane do not support chief Vaaltyn B. They prefer his rival, Vaaltyn A. 
However, while they are against Vaaltyn B’s rule, their responses indicate that they are 
not necessarily against the institution of chieftainship per se. Although this is the case, 
this study does take into consideration that the group interviews conducted for this 
research may not be sufficient to conclude that chieftainship in Vaaltyn remains 
popular. Thus there is a need for scholars to continue to embark on extensive research 
to identify the areas in which chiefs remain supported and to determine in those areas 
where they are still popular, why that is the case.  
 
8 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1 Vaaltyn (referred to as Mokopane on the map) and surrounding chiefdoms 
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Rationale 
This thesis arises out of my Honours dissertation entitled ‘Traditional Authority in the 
context of democratic governance: A case study of a dynastic dispute in Vaaltyn.’ In that 
work, the research focused on the relationship between traditional leaders and local 
government in democratic South Africa. The dynamics of this relationship were 
explored through an ongoing chieftainship dispute around the incumbent Kekana chief 
in the area of Mokopane, Vaaltyn (Limpopo Province). The current dispute emerged 
when chief Alfred Kekana died in 2001. The royal family split into two rival factions, 
each supporting its own candidate. In the same year the local and provincial 
government intervened. They conducted interviews with both the contending tribal 
councils and decided to grant recognition to only one of the contending chiefs. 
I argued in the dissertation that the chieftainship dispute in Vaaltyn was about gaining 
political recognition within a democratic space. Chieftainship is a source of political 
power in itself, as it provides allocative authority. Chiefs in particular have a stake in 
recognition as legitimate participants in a democracy in their own right.  In addition, I 
argued that oral accounts of tradition were manipulated by the contending tribal 
councils and used to secure a place within a democratic discourse. Recognition provides 
the successful tribal faction with material and political resources to which only the 
officially recognised group could gain access. I emphasized that the acknowledged tribal 
faction was not the only recipient of the benefits that accrued to those in office but also 
that the local government benefited through being able to acquire communal lands for 
the municipality. Hence I showed in the study that the structuring of chieftainship post-
1994 resonated with the earlier system, but the shift in the status of chiefs within the 
new state, provided chiefs with an opportunity to legitimise their power and authority 
in a new and comfortable relationship with local government.  
A significant dimension of the struggle was that some of the local councillors straddled 
democratic office and their position in the chief’s council as members of the chiefly 
lineage. This created a complex intersecting set of potentially conflicting interests, 
where local government policies flowed into chiefly realms of responsibility for land 
allocation. Thus local government was responsible for providing RDP housing for the 
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chief’s subjects on communal land, which first had to be acquired from the chief. How 
this was acquired is not clear.  
What is clear is that there was a significant dispute about who the legitimate heir was, 
what the customary procedures for inheritance of the chiefdom were, who the principal 
wife of the deceased chief was, and thus who had legitimate authority as chief. The 
dispute in Vaaltyn was couched in customary lineage terms, imbricated within material 
interests.   
Given the limitations of an honours project, a range of unanswered questions remained. 
This thesis addresses some of the questions which could not be asked in the honours 
project about the delimitation of the relationship between chiefs and their ‘subjects’. It 
explores the questions of who supports the chief; who are the contending Kekana chiefs; 
why and how far do they follow one faction or another; and why do people remain 
within the traditional bounds of the chiefdom? This leads on to a series of key questions 
about the legitimacy of chiefs. The answer to these questions will deepen our 
understanding of the continued salience of chieftainship under a post-apartheid 
dispensation. The thesis illuminates political and economic relations that accrue to the 
tribal faction that is recognised by the democratic government. It attempts to illustrate 
the manner in which contention for legitimacy between the two candidates paves the 
way for the growth of economic and political relations with, for example, the mines and 
local government.  It attempts to show how individuals acting within the boundaries of 
patronage networks make binding decisions on behalf of those who are not formally 
recognised, the people and the impact of such networks on those considered to be 
outside these networks.  
Literature Review 
Debates on chieftaincy in South Africa 
In 1909 the British Parliament drafted a new constitution that led to the formation of 
the Union of South Africa in 1910. This paved the way for what Leonard Thompson 
referred to as ‘the institutionalisation of white supremacy’1, with all of the non-white 
                                                             
1
 Thompson, L. ‘The Compromise of the Union.’ In The Oxford History of South Africa, 2 Vols: South Africa 
1870-1966, pp325-64. (Eds) Wilson M and Thompson L. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971 
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groups excluded from the constitution. The Union was accompanied by the formation of 
both African and Afrikaner nationalist movements which rapidly developed side by side 
and in direct opposition to each other. Among other struggle organisations that were 
formed, the South African National Native Congress (SANNC) was established in 1912, 
in 1923 renamed the African National Congress (ANC). The Congress claimed to 
represent the interests of various African groupings in South Africa, thus Thema stated 
that the Congress was ‘a gathering of tribes that have never met before....and a gathering 
of chiefs who had never seen each other before...’2  Sheridan Johns observed that 
‘Representatives from provincial associations, leaders of local vigilante groups, chiefs 
and other prominent Africans from throughout South Africa joined the Congress.’ 3 
Among those who were present at the founding Conference of the SANNC were, chief 
Maama, Molembo, Sayso and Sekhukhuni.4 It is clear from both Walshe (1971) and Meli 
(1988), that chiefs were part of the ANC as early as its formation and that the ANC made 
an effort to accommodate chiefs. Following the model of the British parliamentary 
system, the SANNC established an upper house of chiefs and a lower house of 
commoners, with each house having a president. Among other reasons that account for 
the SANNC allegiance to chiefs was that some members of the SANNC such as Seetsele 
Modiri Molema, Elias Moreletse, Moses Kotane, Mweli Skota and others were 
themselves of royal descent. This does not however mean that chiefs had an 
uncontested relationship with all members of the SANNC. There were tensions between 
chiefs, their supporters in Congress and those members of the SANNC whose 
nationalistic ideas drew them away from those who threatened what they perceived to 
be the national project. 
One of the earliest pieces of legislation that created uproar among chiefs and the newly 
formed Congress in South Africa was the enactment of the Land Act of 1913. Although 
                                                             
2 Thema, S. (1977). ‘ The Life of the Late Dr Pixley Seme.’ The African Drum July 1953. Chicago: Carter-
Karis Documents Collection in microform, 2XS14, 1977 
3 Johns, S, Karis,  Protest and Hope’ 1882-1934. (Vol 1 ‘From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of 
African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964, edited by T. Karis & G.M. Carter (eds), Washington: Hoover 
Institution. p 61 
4 Walshe, P. (1971). ‘The rise of African Nationalism in South Africa: The African National Congress, 1912-
1952’. Berkeley: The University of California Press. p 33 
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dispossession had a long history, this particular Act would have severe consequences 
for African rights to ownership of land, sharecropping and ultimately for independent 
socio-economic opportunities for black agrarian society. Chiefs were deeply concerned 
about the enactment of this Act. As a result, they formed part of the SANNC delegation 
that was sent to contest this legislation. 
Building on the 1913 Land Act, the Native Administration Act was enacted in 1927. 
Among other things, this law put to test the legitimacy of chiefs as it bestowed dual 
accountability upon them, first to their subjects and then to the Governor General, who 
was seen as the Paramount Chief in terms of Native Administration. Simons and Simons 
(1969) suggest that the Native Administration Act set up a separate legal system for the 
administration of African law.5 Claassens & Cousins (2008) forty years later 
characterise this as a model that created a ‘highly authoritarian understanding of chiefly 
rule’.6 Under the Act, the Governor General could appoint any person as chief or 
headman in charge of a tribe or location, he could overthrow any chief or headmen and 
was authorized to define their powers, duties and privileges (1927 Act, Chapter 1 of 
Section 1). Scholars have argued that this was a measure primarily intended to accord 
with the design of territorial segregation rather than enhance traditional authority per 
se. 
The Union of South Africa was not unique in the construction of separate homogeneous 
cultural units with their own system of law and governance. The views of Mamdani 
(1996) and Evans (1997) seem to coincide with Beinart and Dubow’s (1995) 
observation that apartheid ‘built on refined policies of the Union of South Africa’s 
indirect rule, which took comparable notions of culture, community, customary law and 
chieftaincy as their point of departure’.7 
                                                             
5 See, Simons, J and Simons, R. (1969), ‘Class & Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950.’ The University of 
Michigan: Penguin publishers. p 345 
6 Claassens, A & Cousins B. (2008). ‘Land Power and Customs: Controversies generated by the Communal 
Land Rights Act.’ Cape Town: UCT Press. p 223 
7 Beinart, W and Dubow, S (1995). ‘Segregation and Apartheid in the Twentieth Century South Africa.’ 
London: Routledge                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
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The 1927 Act saw the prolongation of segregation when the Bantu Authorities Act of 
1951 was endorsed. This policy introduced the homelands system, in which Africans 
were to develop separately under tribal authorities. It made provision for the 
establishment of regional and territorial authorities for each specific ethnic group in the 
reserves.  This did not mean that chieftaincy would therefore be exercised in isolation 
from the state. Rather chieftaincy became a subordinate function of the apartheid state. 
According to Ntsebeza, traditional authorities were appointed from above and were 
protected by the apartheid government so long as they continued to be cooperative. 
Davenport maintains that appointed ‘chiefs’ were ‘well rewarded for their preparedness 
to enforce government policy at the expense of their own popularity’.8 Copelyn 
elaborates on the concessions granted to those chiefs who were willing to collaborate, 
when his research revealed that: 
Paramount Botha Sigcau had his salary increased from 700 pounds to 1500 
pounds p.a upon accepting the Bantu Authorities system. Whatever the price, it 
remained a fact that chiefs could not be relied upon to represent Mpondo 
interests to the government, but rather had turned round in their stools and 
were prepared to implement state interests independently of general Mpondo 
sentiments.9  
The dual responsibility that chiefs held to both their subjects and first to the colonial 
and subsequently to the segregation and apartheid states lead scholars to conclude that 
chiefs were accomplices to the oppression of their rural subjects. As a result the 
institution of chieftaincy was not expected to make its way into the democratic era.10 
Some scholars raised the concern that the principles of traditional leadership are not 
attuned with democratic principles.11 Ntsebeza concluded that there is no reason for 
chiefs to continue to exist within a democratic dispensation, given their chequered 
                                                             
8
 Davenport, T. R. H. (1987). ‘South Africa: A Modern History’,  Toronto: University Press. p 383 
9 Copelyn, J. ‘The Mpondo Revolts, 1960.’ Paper presented at the African Studies Seminar, June 1974. p 10 
10 See Oomen, B. (2002). ‘Chiefs! Law, Power and Culture in contemporary South Africa.’ New York: 
Palgrave.;Van Kessel (1997); and Ntsebeza, L. (2005). ‘Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of 
Land in South Africa.’ Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers. p. 20.  
11 See, Ntsebeza, L. (2005) p. 20. Banks, L and Southall, R. (1996). Traditional leaders in South Africa’s 
New Democracy’ Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, Nos 37-38 (special double issue), p 427.  
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history and the fact that democratic structures are in place. 12 Drawing on his work on 
Ghana which focuses on chiefs, the state and legitimacy, Ray (1996) brings in another 
dimension when he argues that both forms of governance derive their powers from 
separate sources and that the legitimacy of both institutions is parallel.13 At no point 
does Ray foresee a system in which both institutions rely on each other to gain or 
sustain their legitimacy. For these reasons chieftaincy was not expected to continue 
within the democratic system.  
Nonetheless, from Oomen’s point of view traditional leadership was ‘resurrected’.14 She 
argues that traditional leadership made a surprise re-entry into democracy because of 
broader developments that were occurring globally. In another view Ntsebeza 
maintained that traditional leaders survived because of their historical role in land 
allocation and allegiance to both the colonial and the apartheid states. In his 
understanding, the institution of chieftainship without state support would collapse.15 
Although Ntsebeza has a point in asserting that chiefs survived because of their role in 
land administration, his argument is overstated as a generalisaton. In areas such as 
Sekhukhune, chieftainship survived, among other reasons, because of its historical and 
cultural legitimacy and popularity within rural communities. The issue here, which 
pertains equally to the present case study of Vaaltyn, is how generalisable individual 
case studies can be. This pertains to Xhalanga, which is the case study chosen by 
Ntsebeza where chieftainship had been challenged and undermined by the state and the 
people.16 Ntsebeza suggests that in Xhalanga, unlike ‘KwaZulu, Phondoland and Tshezi, 
chieftainship never entrenched itself’.17 He gives two reasons behind the failure of chiefs 
to establish themselves in the area. First, Ntsebeza points to the heterogeneous and the 
                                                             
12 See, for more details Ntsebeza, 2005.  
13 Ray D. I. (1996) Divided Sovereignty: Traditional authority and the state in Ghana. Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law, Nos 37-38 (special double issue) 
14 See, Oomen, B. (2002). The idea that chieftainship  was ‘resurrected’ is problematic given that this 
institution never died. Although its credibility has been tainted, it has remained resilient. 
15 Ntsebeza 2005, p 20 
16 Ibid, p56 
17 Ibid, p 56 
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multi-faceted class and ethnic divisions within the Xhalanga population. He observes 
that Xhalanga was comprised of Africans from different clans. The Coloureds and the 
amaMfengu were known as the ‘school people’, (those who were educated), lived 
without chiefs and were also beneficiaries of the 1883 Thembuland Commission. They 
were independent landholders who were also relatively progressive and fervently 
opposed to the institution of chieftainship as compared to the ‘Red people’, who lived a 
traditional life. On the contrary the Red people, also known as amaqaba, were under the 
jurisdiction of chiefs; were considered to be conservative; and opposed the church and 
change and derived their livelihood from cattle ownership.  
In Ntsebeza’s view, the second predicament to hamper the entrenchment of 
chieftainship in Xhalanga was that ‘the colonial state tarnished the institution before 
abolishing it’.18 The British government imposed chieftainship in the district in 1865. 
Xhalanga was under the authority of chief Gecelo whereas Southeyville was controlled 
by chief Stokwe. The colonial administration abolished the institution of chieftainship in 
the area following both chief’s participation in the 1880 Gun War. This had marked the 
end of chieftainship in Xhalanga until its re-imposition in the 1950’s under the Bantu 
Authorities Act. The apartheid government supported chief Kaiser Matanzima for he 
was very loyal to the administration. Thus they intended for him to be sworn in as the 
Paramount chief of Emigrant Thembuland and to install chief Ngonyama Gecelo and 
Jamangile Stokwe as sub-chiefs of Xhalanga. The people of Xhalanga revolted against 
chief Matanzima, maintaining that they preferred chief Sabata Dalindyebo to take up the 
position of paramount chief. Here Ntsebeza suggests that the Xhalanga people’s 
preference for chief Sabata over Matanzima needs to be understood in the context that 
the school people had constantly rejected the existence of chiefs. However, Ntsebeza 
points to the fact that the Xhalanga, including the school people, preferred chief Sabata 
because he had minimal relations with the apartheid administration compared to chief 
Matanzima. Nonetheless, events that would follow would show that the magistrate 
intended to use chief Sabata to persuade the rural residents of Xhalanga to accept tribal 
authorities in the area. As a result, chieftainship has historically been unpopular in 
Xhalanga. 
                                                             
18 Ibid, p 56 
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Contrary to Ntsebeza, Oomen shows in her study of chieftainship in Sekhukhune 
(Limpopo) that between 1998-1999, 80 percent of people were in support of traditional 
leaders. She has illustrated that support for chieftainship in Sekhukhune is issue-based 
and that the reasons ranged from land allocation, dispute resolution and their role in 
initiation schools. Additionally Oomen maintains that chiefly support in Sekhukhune 
was based on the personality of a chief and his performance. Critics of traditional 
leadership have often argued that the institution of traditional leadership is 
discriminatory and it is indisputable that this prejudice is deeply felt by rural women.19 
Even so, Oomen’s case study stems from a different perspective in that 83 percent of 
women compared to 80 percent of men supported chieftainship. These women also 
rated their traditional leader higher than men villagers. Only a few of these women 
believed that traditional leadership is discriminatory. Oomen accounts for the strong 
support of chieftainship in the areas of Sekhukhune and of particularly women as a 
result of chieftainship being the only form of governance in rural remote areas to date. 
Thus the majority of women whose husbands are migrant labourers, rely on the 
institution of chieftainship for support and justice. 
It could also be argued that the history of chieftainship in the areas of Sekhukhune may 
influence its continuing existence. While the colonial administrations attempted in 
various ways to influence the polity of Sekhukhune, their efforts were counteracted 
with resistance from the Sekhukhune chiefs and their subjects. To defend his chiefdom 
from European colonization, Sekhukhune sent young men to work on white farms and 
on diamonds mines.20 The money earned by these young men was taxed and used to 
buy guns from the Portuguese and cattle to increase the wealth of the Marota people.21 
The 1800’s had marked years of war and resistance against the Boers and later the 
British for the chiefs of Sekhukhune and their subjects. This resistance would be 
demonstrated in years to come in the area of Sekhukhune. In 1912, chief Kgolo 
Sekhukhune played an integral part in the formation of the ANC. He represented the 
                                                             
19 See for example Meer, S. 1997. ‘Women land and Authority: Perspectives from South Africa.’ Cape Town: 
David Phillips and Oxford: Oxfam 
20 See Delius, P. (1983). ‘The land belongs to us’. Cape Town: Ravan Press 
21 Ibid 
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Sekhukhune community and played a crucial role in the struggle for liberation. Later in 
the 1950’s following the enactment of the Bantu Authorities, the people in Sekhukhune 
resisted the authorities through organisations such as Fetakgomo - a predominantly 
migrant worker organisation aligned to the ANC. Chiefs in the surrounding areas of 
Sekhukhune formed an integral part of the ANC.  
However, Sekhukhune should not be romanticised as a chiefdom that has not been 
without internal disputes or those who were prepared to collaborate with the colonial 
administration. Certainly, there were individuals who were prepared to accept disputed 
pieces of legislation and proposals such as the Betterment scheme. What is striking 
about the area of Sekhukhune is that despite the temptations of the colonial 
administration, chiefs in Sekhukhune showed resistance to the role of the colonial 
administration and later to the apartheid government in Pedi affairs in one form or 
another. Oomen’s case study of Sekhukhune and Ntsebeza’s Xhalanga study open up a 
platform for scholars to begin to think about a comparative history of rural 
communities under the authority of chiefs. Such communities can also be found in parts 
of the Mpumalanga, North West, Limpopo and KwaZulu Natal. Engaging with the 
histories of these communities may arguably explain more widely, a critical question in 
this study, which is why chieftainship in certain parts of South Africa remains salient. 
The findings of such studies provide policy makers with an understanding of the 
significance and role of chiefs in post apartheid South Africa. 
 The confusion about the role of chiefs began after the 1994 elections. The ANC-led 
government was undecided about the actual role of chiefs in local government. 
Following pressure from the Opposition and the Congress of Traditional Leaders of 
South Africa (Contralesa), the South African Parliament finally proposed the 
Governmental Framework of Traditional Leadership of 2003. The Governmental 
Framework, like the Bantu Authorities Act, established traditional councils which would 
play an advisory role to the local government. Local government responsibilities were 
defined in the 1998 White Paper as developmental local government that involves 
integrated development planning. Such planning was seen as participatory. Pycroft 
stated that ‘Developmental local government seeks to democratize local government by 
not only introducing the notion of elected representatives in rural areas, but also into 
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transforming local governance, with a new focus on improving the standards of living 
and quality of life of previously disadvantage sectors of the community’.22 Traditional 
leaders were to be incorporated as part of this development strategy in rural areas.  
This framework also made provisions for the formation of the Commission of 
Traditional Leadership Dispute and Claims that was to ‘restore the dignity of traditional 
institutions’.23The Commission was to resolve cases where leadership positions were 
contested by investigating whether traditional leadership had been established in 
accordance with customary law - section 25 (1) of the Framework Act. This Commission 
raised the question that is relevant to the Vaaltyn case, that is, whether government 
officials should intervene in the affairs of the institution of traditional leadership and if 
so, to what extant?  
The continuous pressures from chiefs and Contralesa for a clarified and active role in a 
democratic dispensation led to the enactment of the Communal Land Rights Act of 2004. 
The Act came about as a strategic attempt to compensate for those who were 
dispossessed during the apartheid era through legalization of security of tenure in 
South Africa’s former homelands (Section 25 (6) of the Constitution). This Act awarded 
chiefs major powers in land administration. Thus scholars such as Meer (1997) and 
Ntsebeza (2005) argued that the responsibility for land administration awarded to 
chiefs reinforced inequalities and indeed hindered the necessary conditions for 
women’s soci-economic position to transform. However, the role of chiefs other than in 
land administration has not been thoroughly outlined.    
An overview of the existing literature demonstrates that the colonial and apartheid 
administrations had immeasurable detrimental effects on the credibility of the 
institution of chieftainship. Scholars discuss traditional leadership as an institution that 
develops outside the formal state whereas in fact chieftainship developed in 
                                                             
22Pycroft, C.1998. Democracy and Delivery: The Rationalization of Local Government. in South Africa. 
Journal of Public Administration and Developmen,t Vol 9, Issue 2, p 58 
23 See, section 22 (1) of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003 
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conjunction with the colonial, apartheid and the democratic government.24 At times the 
maintenance of chieftainship was linked to its subordinate role in the colonial 
administration, with chiefs becoming a rural extension of the state through those chiefs 
who were willing to collaborate. In other instances chiefs maintained agency through 
resistance and proved that the existence of the chiefly institution was historically 
independent from the colonial state, with its own pre-colonial history. Rather than the 
shared perception among scholars that chiefs became mere puppets of the colonial 
state, it can be argued that the colonial administration and chiefs became 
interdependent. This can be observed in the case study under consideration in this 
thesis, where the chief and the democratic government mutually support each other. 
The reasons for this are complex, but relate as much to the continued salience of chiefs 
as it does to the need of the democratic state to acquire support of the chiefs and to 
integrate chiefdoms into its govenence structures.  
Even though the democratic government holds hegemonic power, influence in decision 
making and adheres to the South African Constitution, at various times it relies on chiefs 
to further its democratic projects just as the colonial state and apartheid government 
needed the chiefs to extend control through their segregationist policies over the rural 
population. This thesis proposes the interdependence in Vaaltyn between chief Vaaltyn 
B and the democratic government. The chief’s authority is maintained by the political 
and economic activities that take place with the help of the local and provincial 
government. However, the complexity of the question of legitimacy is raised by the 
research. The research shows that the legitimatisation of chief Vaaltyn B by the 
government does not automatically make him accepted by the community in Vaaltyn 
and surrounding areas. 
                                                             
24 See Ntsebeza, L. (2005). p. 20. Banks, L and Southall, R. (1996). Traditional leaders in South Africa’s 
New Democracy’ Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, Nos 37-38 (special double issue), p 427. 
Ray D. I. (1996) Divided Sovereignty: Traditional authority and the state in Ghana. Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law, Nos 37-38 (special double issue) 
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Vaaltyn25 is one of 18 villages under the authority of chief Vaaltyn B. It is represented in 
the Mogalakwena Local Municipality, within the Waterberg District Municipality. Sotho 
and Northern Ndebele are the languages that are predominantly spoken in these 
villages. There are more Ndebele speaking residents in Vaaltyn than there are in other 
areas.26 I have argued elsewhere that ‘communication through the Ndebele dialect is a 
symbolic demonstration of being actively involved in an ongoing broader struggle for 
ethnic recognition, as the northern Ndebele have long felt that they have been 
marginalised and slowly absorbed into various ethnic identities situated around the 
area’.27 
An overview of the Ndebele in South Africa 
The Ndebele people in South Africa are divided into two groups, known as the Southern 
Ndebele and the Northern Ndebele. Although scholars from various disciplines largely 
agree on their origin and history, their genealogy, orthography and patterns of 
migration however are presented disjointedly and thus remain contested. These 
inconsistencies could perhaps be accounted for by the fact that the scholars who studied 
the two ethnic groups such as Van Warmelo, Van Vuuren, Zietvogel, Jackson and De 
Beer, were unfamiliar with the language and the cultural practices of their subjects. 
They relied on translated versions that were recorded by their field assistants. 
Moreover, the genealogies and movement patterns could have been distorted through 
the transmission of oral and written testimonies. As a result, the history and genealogies 
                                                             
25 The area is named after Vaaltyn (Likxhobo) who was chief in 1910, it is also referred to as Moshate ‘the 
chiefly kraal’. Both the contending chiefs have been named Vaaltyn after the earlier chief. In order to 
avoid confusion I have named the contending chiefs Vaaltyn B (born in 1974) who is the government 
recognized chief, and Vaaltyn A (born in 1964) who is largely recognized by the people as the legitimate 
chief. The distinction between the two chiefs as Vaaltyn A and Vaaltyn B is mine and is based on their age 
differences 
26 See Hofmeyr, I. (1993). ‘We spend our years as a tale that is untold’. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand 
University Press. p 19 
27 See, Lekgoathi, S, P. (2003). ‘Chiefs, Migrants and North Ndebele Ethnicity in the Context of Surrounding 
Homeland Politics 1965-1978’. African Studies. Vol. 62(1), pp. 53 - 77 and Dineo Skosana, ‘The interface 
between traditional leadership and the democratic government in a context of a succession dispute: A case 
study of Vaaltyn (Mokopane)’ p6. (Unpublished Seminar Paper, NRF Chair in Local Histories and Present 
Realities). 
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of the Northern Ndebele that are discussed concurrently to that of the Southern Ndebele 
in this thesis, is not immune to these inconsistencies. The presentation of names and 
family trees in this thesis may at times be inconsistent with those presented by earlier 
scholars. An example in this thesis is that while a faction of the chiefly family 
interviewed for this research presented themselves as the Kekana, another faction 
preferred being recorded as the Gegana. The first representation can be associated with 
the orthography of the Pedi of Limpopo whereas the second belongs to the orthography 
of the Northern Ndebele. This illuminates among other things the entwined relations of 
the Northern Ndebele and the Pedi but also suggests factors that influence orthography 
such as the informants in a study and the context within which a study is conducted. 
The origin of the Southern Ndebele is relatively well documented, as compared to that 
of the Northern Ndebele. The Southern Ndebele constitutes of the Manala, Ndzunzda, 
and Mhwaduba.28 Although studies have documented the origins of the Manala and 
Ndzundza, the Mhwaduba have been neglected. The beginning of the 19th century 
marked a succession dispute that split Musi’s sons into two main groups. The one group 
lead by Ndzundza left their original settlement area located near Pretoria, towards the 
East, and finally settled in Mpumalanga. The second group according to De Beer, first 
moved in the same direction as the Ndzundza and then moved northwards, where they 
finally settled in Mokopane (former Potgietersrus) and surrounding areas. This group 
was under the leadership of Musi’s other son, Mthombeni. Not much is known about the 
history of Musi’s remaining three sons except that one of them went back to Natal while 
Manala and his followers remained in Pretoria.29  
 At least four perspectives with regards to the History of the Northern Ndebele can be 
drawn. The first and most popular viewpoint is maintained by scholars such Van 
Warmelo (1930) and Van Vuuren (1983) who argued that there is a genealogical 
relation among the Northern and Southern Ndebele people of South Africa. This view 
proposes that the South African Ndebele stems from one ancestry, chief Musi who 
                                                             
28 De Beer, F. (1986). ‘Groepsgebondenheid in die familie- opvolgings- en erfreg van die Noord Ndebele.’ PhD 
Thesis. Pretoria: Univesiteit van Pretoria. p 31 
29 Van Warmelo, J. (1930). ‘Transvaal Ndebele Texts.’ South Africa:  Ethological Publications 
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originated from the KwaZulu-Natal area. According to Van Warmelo, the language and 
customs of the Ndebele people of South Africa illustrate that they are descendants of the 
Nguni.30 In this perspective, the Northern Ndebele are the descendants of Gegana, also 
known as Mthombeni who was one of Musi’s sons. The Mthombeni’s are said to have 
moved to the now Roossenekal where they further separated with one group moving to 
Muledhlana, in Zebediela near the former Potgietersrus. It was during this time that 
Gegana established himself as Kekana of the Northern Ndebele.31  
By contrast, Zietvogel maintains that the Ndebele people originated from the then 
Rhodesia. He adds that they moved south and spent time in Phalaborwa and then 
settled among the Swazi before moving to Mokopane.32 He accounts for the similarities 
between the spoken Northern Ndebele and Swati words as evidence that both groups 
were at once in contact.  He subdivides the Northern Ndebele into three main groups, 
namely the Langa, Ledwaba and Moletlane. He also argues that these main subgroups 
consist of several smaller groups which are: the Langa of Mapela and Bakenberg 
sections; the Ledwaba of BakwaMashashane and Ba kwaMaraba of Ngidigidlana; and 
the Muledlane of Bakwasibidiela and bakwaMugomhane.33 
Jackson presented another dimension when he argued against the idea that the 
Northern Ndebele people originate from Musi.34 His position had been that the 
Northern Ndebele are the people of Langa who originated from the former Zululand and 
that they are the descendants of an ancestral chief, called Langalibalele.35 In Jackson’s 
perspective, the Ledwaba and Gegana originate from the Southern Ndebele.  
                                                             
30 Ibid 
31 Ibid, p 11 
32 Ziervogel, D. (1959). ‘A Grammar of Northern Transvaal Ndebele’. Pretoria.  
33 Ibid, p 4 
34 Jackson, A., O. (1983). ‘The Ndebele of Langa’ Department of co-operation and development, Ethnological 
Publication No. 54 (Pretoria, Government Printer, 1983), p. 125. 
35 Jackson 69, p 1 
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Wilkes offered the last dimension that is more of a critique of Zietvogel’s view. He 
explained that Zietvogel may have misunderstood the return of Mthombeni’s followers 
from Zimbabwe as the emigration of the Ndebele tribe from Zimbabwe. He points out 
that while the Mthombeni group settled in the former Potgietersrus, there was a 
subsequent split which lead another group to Phalaborwa then Zimbabwe and later 
returned to Potgietersrus.  
Although there are divergent perspectives about the history of these two groups, there 
has been consensus that the Northern Ndebele language and cultural practises are 
different from that of the Southern Ndebele. Today the Northern and Southern Ndebele 
can be found in parts of Gauteng, Limpopo, North West and Mpumalanga. The Kekana 
who are of interest to this study, are located in Mokopane36 (formerly known as 
Potgietersrus)37 Limpopo Province. They are referred to and also refer to themselves, as 
the people of Mokopane38. Hofmeyr (1993) records three periods of significance in the 
chiefdom of Vaaltyn and explains how the name of the area came about.  She points out 
that through the South African Republic Location Commission in the nineteenth century, 
‘Vaaltyn was designated a rural location in 1890. Locations referred to chiefdoms which 
were given state recognition39 after undergoing major territorial reduction.’40 Such 
locations, Hofmeyr adds, ‘took the name of chief, and the chiefdom under discussion 
here was variously known as Makapan’s Location or Valtyn41 Makapan’s Location’.42 
                                                             
36 Adopted in 2003 in commemoration of the chief Mokopane who is said to have killed Piet Potgeiter 
during the 1854 siege in which the Northern Ndebele were besieged by the Boers. 
37 Named after a Voortrekker leader, Piet Potgieter. 
38 An earlier chief of the Kekana. 
39 According to Hofmeyr, I. (1993). ‘We spend our years as a tale that is untold’. Johannesburg: 
Witwatersrand University Press, recognition to some extant gave these areas some form of self 
governance. See, p. 11 
40  ibid 
41 Hofmeyr uses the orthography for Vaaltyn as Valtyn whereas De Beer uses Vaaltyn. I have used Vaaltyn 
based on the minute book of the unrecognised tribal council and the municipal archival records. See 
Isabel Hofmeyr (1993) ‘We spent our years as a tale that is told’ and De Beer, F. (1986). 
‘Groepsgebondenheid in die familie- opvolgings- en erfreg van die Noord Ndebele’. In die Faculteit Letter en 
Wysbegeerte Univesiteit van Pretoria, Pretoria 
24 
 
The author also discusses ‘the second threshold of change to affect the chiefdom’ in the 
1930s under the Native Affairs Department. This period she characterised as ‘state 
intervention in African societies to manage land shortage’43. The latter gave rise to 
‘betterment’ policies which were widely contested. Hofmeyr notes that ‘by the 1950s, 
with the National Party in power, this administrative faintheartedness began to 
disappear as coercive social engineering in the countryside was speed up. These 
changes ushered in a third threshold of transformation for the chiefdom’.44 Vaaltyn was 
classified in the 1960s as a betterment area which was to be subjected to forced 
removals. In Hofmeyr’s analysis, the ‘relocations required people to move from cluster-
style settlements into grid plan villages.’45 This affected the structure of chieftainship 
when certain areas became grouped under the Pedi (Northern Sotho) homeland of 
Lebowa and some of the Northern Ndebele speaking people found themselves located in 
Bophuthatswana.46 The Southern Ndebele were given their own homeland, Kwa 
Ndebele in the 1970’s.  The rationale behind this, was that the Southern Ndebele47 were 
more ‘authentic’ as they had preserved their language and cultural practices in contrast 
to the Northern Ndebele who were also viewed as a minority.48 The question regarding 
the authenticity of the Northern Ndebele has always been subject to debate. Among 
others, Doke argued that the Northern and Southern Ndebele’s forms of speech should 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
42 ibid 
43 See, Hofmeyr. (1993). ‘We spend our years as a tale that is untold.’  p11 
44 ibid 
45 ibid 
46 See S, P, Lekgoathi, 'Chiefs, Migrants and North Ndebele Ethnicity in the Context of  Surrounding 
Homeland Politics,’ African Studies, 1965-1978, 62: 1 (2003), p 56 and the idea of ‘Tswanarisation’ of 
citing Van Warmelo (1930) Transvaal Ndebele Texts. South Africa:  Ethological Publications. 
47 What distinguishes the Northern to the Southern Ndebele is their language. See Hofmeyr (1993) and 
Coetzee (1980) thesis for details. Their marriage system, their traditional garments and the structure of 
their houses also sets them apart.  
48 See, Lekgoathi, S, P. (2009). 'Colonial' experts, local interlocutors, informants and the making of an 
archive on the 'Transvaal Ndebele' 1930-1989. Journal of African History. Vol 50(1),pp 61-80. p. 71 
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be regarded as various forms of the same language.49 Meanwhile Van Wyk and Ziervogel 
argued that the language spoken by the two groups were not similar and therefore 
should be given independent recognition.50 Mokopane is one of the areas in which the 
people were actively involved in a struggle for recognition. This is a struggle that has 
continued post-1994 through ethnic organisations such as the Northern Amandebele 
National Organisation (NANO).51 The dynamics of the Northern Ndebele ethnic group 
and their history makes the Kekana worth studying. In addition, the area they inhabit 
which is bounded by the Pedi, makes it even more of an interesting case to study.   
 
Methodology 
A colleague conducted research in the Makapan Valley in which she had to work closely 
with the tribal council that has not been given recognition by the Mokopane local 
government. She introduced me to the area and the side of the Kekana chiefly family 
that is not acknowledged. On the other side of the dispute, I was able to establish 
contact with the recognised tribal council members through Kojela Kekana who is a 
member of the chiefly family whose position regarding the dispute has been impartial. 
The interviews took place at different times and places as the councils are mutually 
hostile. In the first instance I had applied to interview chief Vaaltyn A and members of 
the Kekana family, and to my astonishment on the day of introductions and interviews 
he was in the company of a tribal council which consists of about twenty men.  52 The 
majority of the tribal council belong to the Kekana family. It is tradition for the council 
to be interviewed as a group or to speak on behalf of the chief.  Vaaltyn A was present 
during the interviews, but did not converse directly until I had to conduct interviews 
with him concerning his background and personality. 
                                                             
49 Doke, (1954), p 23 
50 Van Wyk, (1966), p 36 and  Zietvogel, (1969), p 36 
51 Lekgoathi, S, P. (2003). ‘Chiefs, Migrants and North Ndebele Ethnicity in the Context of Surrounding 
Homeland Politics 1965-1978’. African Studies. Vol. 62(1), pp. 53 – 77. p. 53 
52 Older and younger women and men also formed part of the tribal council. 
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 On the other side, Vaaltyn B who is recognised by the government was never present 
during any of the interviews. I only encountered his tribal council, which comprises of 
five men. Not being able to interview Vaaltyn B directly was limiting, as certain personal 
questions could have been better answered by him. Even so, both his tribal council and 
the unrecognised tribal council provided substantial amount of information about him.  
In addition, the interviews conducted with people from different villages under his 
authority brought some understanding about his personality and the type of chief he is. 
This study utilized a combination of methods, oral life histories, semi-structured 
interviews and participant observation. In addition, the unrecognised tribal faction 
offered their minute book which dates to 1993. This is an exceptionally useful source, as 
it outlines the activities of the Kekana chieftainship prior to 1994 and during the 
transitional period. The Mogalakwena local municipality also gave permission for access 
to their transitional local government minutes. The records were valuable as they could 
be used to compare the data collected through interviews and comparisons could also 
be made with the tribal minute book. 
The oral life history method was helpful as it unpacked the historical dynamics of the 
Kekana chieftainship. It also helped outline the internal family politics and explained 
how this internal conflict shaped local politics and vice versa. The method elucidated an 
historical understanding of how the current chief Vaaltyn gained legitimacy and how he 
has maintained his authority. There is a consensus about the limitations of the oral life 
history method. Authors such as Hofmeyr53, Comaroff and Roberts54, illustrate that life 
stories are often modified as they get transmitted from one generation to another. In the 
context of a dispute, Comaroff and Roberts record that ‘the elaboration of an argument 
depends on the oratorical abilities of the complainant, their calculations concerning the 
opponent and the complainant strategic intentions’.55 They add that at various points 
                                                             
53 Hofmeyr, I. (1993). ‘We spend our years as a tale that is untold’. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand 
University Press.  
54 Comaroff, J & S Roberts. (1981). ‘Rules and Processes: The Cultural Logic of Dispute In An African 
Context’, Chicago: University of Chicago p. 84 
55 Ibid 
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‘the claimants and their opposition may refine their claims’.56 I have argued that ‘the 
presentation of the argument also depends on who the arbiter or the audience is and 
the reward that results from a successful elaboration of an argument’.57 The 
Mogalakwena municipal records were useful in either substantiating or invalidating the 
oral evidence acquired during interviews.58  
Parts of this study also relied on semi-structured questions during group interviews. 
Semi-structured interviews were useful, as Legard, R & Ward K state that they allow 
new questions to be brought up during the interview based on the response of the 
participant.59 In addition, this type of interview allows observation of the participant’s 
non-verbal behaviour, thus allowing the researcher an opportunity to assess the 
feelings behind the respondent’s answers. The limitation of conducting interviews with 
a group was often that certain voices were more dominant than others during the 
interviews. These were voices of senior council members or those among villagers who 
were not shy to express their concerns. Nonetheless this method allowed one to observe 
the dynamics of the tribal council and the reaction of the participants.   
 
Chapter Outline  
Each chapter combined oral testimonies, open-ended interviews with individual, group 
interviews and participant observation. Even though I had formulated a set of ways to 
                                                             
56 ibid 
57 Skosana, D. (2009). ‘The interface between traditional leadership and the democratic government in a 
context of a succession dispute: A case study of Vaaltyn (Mokopane)’. Presented in the South African, Swiss 
Joint Research Programme (SSJRP) in Switzerland May, 2010 
58 With the help of Prof Philip Bonner we were able to establish rapport with the mayor of the 
Mogalakwena municipality which then made it possible to access the Municipal records. 
59  Legard, R, Keegan, J. and Ward, K. (2003). ‘In- depth Interviews’. In L. Lewis & J. Ritchie (eds). 
Qualitative Research a guide for Social Science students and researchers. London: Sage Publications  
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collect data to address this thesis question, often the participants changed and 
determined the method that would best address certain questions. 
Chapter two relied a great deal on the interviews conducted with the tribal councils to 
understand who the candidates contending for chieftainship were. Vaaltyn A gave 
permission to be personally interviewed which helped to contrast his personality and 
background against his rival Vaaltyn B. Vaaltyn B’s failure to be interviewed meant that 
one had to deduce his personality through his tribal council’s response.  
Chapter three was written utilising archival sources to construct the process of 
demarcation. The municipal sources corresponded with the unrecognised tribal 
council’s minute book and affirmed some of the interviews which were conducted with 
them. The interviews and the municipal records have shown the manner in which a 
family dispute can exclude those who are not given formal recognition from political 
processes. In addition the data has shown how the recognised members of the chiefly 
family have taken advantage of the dispute to make binding decisions on behalf of the 
whole Kekana chiefly council and communities. These are individuals who have 
patronage ties with the local government which links them into economic activities such 
as mining.  
Chapter four engages and elucidates some of the dynamics discussed in Chapter three. 
The chapter looks at the manner in which the succession dispute created a platform for 
the formation of patronage networks such as the one linking the Platinum Reef mine, 
the Mokopane government and the officially recognised tribal council. It shows how the 
faction of the chiefly family which has not been legitimized by the government is 
sidelined from economic and politically binding decisions. Additionally, it demonstrates 
the impact of these patronage networks on the unrecognised tribal council and the 
villagers. The chapter extensively relied on written testimonies and group interviews 
which were essential in revealing people’s perspectives about the mining companies 
(Platinum Reef in particular) and their activities in the area.  It allowed people to reflect 
on the patronage networks and their impacts within their communities. The villagers 
were also able to reveal how these networks have affected chieftainship in the area and 
vice versa and in general, were able to provide a reflection of chieftaincy.        
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Chapter five engages with the perceptions of the broader populace about the dispute 
and the current incumbent. It also revealed how the dispute and its impact have shaped 
people’s perception about the continued legitimacy of chiefs in the post-apartheid era. 
The purpose of this chapter had been to explore the extent to which (if at all) people 
legitimize the current chief Vaaltyn B. The chapter is also intended to show what people 
think of chieftainship as an institution through evidence from focus groups. I had 
intended to provide an understanding of support of the chief and chieftainship along 
categories of gender, age and class. Gaining access to the wider community was 
challenging as an outsider. I had to take advantage of community meetings which were 
held to address the concerns about the Platinum Reef mine in the various villages under 
the authority of chief Vaaltyn B.  I worked closely with the South African National Civic 
Organisation members (SANCO), some of whom are members of the chiefly family. They 
assumed the role of arranging community meetings and also informed me about the 
dates and times when meetings would be held. People had a choice whether to 
participate or not. It was often not clear how many people would attend these 
gatherings. As I recall, once I had prepared separate questions for older women and 
men and younger men and women. My informant had stated that these meetings would 
take place at a local school. This would allow me to interview a group at a time. Upon 
arrival, however, there were at least a hundred people of whom sixty five remained for 
the interviews. They had gathered at an open soccer field which made it difficult to 
separate them into groups. It was not a conducive setting as the participants had to 
stand during the interview sessions. On one occasion it rained during the course of the 
interviews. Despite the rain, people remained under the shade of their umbrellas. Their 
reasons for staying were that they felt they needed to share their history and struggles 
which, in their view, had been sidelined.  The villagers often presented contesting ideas, 
thus there was no single shared narrative. Although, they reached a consensus at certain 
points.60   
                                                             
60 I use in this thesis the term ‘‘villagers, community, people’’, being aware that the terms are a social 
construction. See Anderson, B. (1991). ‘Imagined Communities’, 2nd ed. London: Verso.  p.  14. Even though 
these terms may be used to describe or refer to a populace with shared interests, this thesis uses the 
terms warily because of the diversity and complexities that exists within these imagined communities. 
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It was difficult to conduct interviews with large numbers of people at once. Certain 
participants dominated the discussion. Moreover the dynamics of the villagers made 
collecting data challenging. The older generation would at times be offended by the 
disrespectful tone of the younger generation. Among the groups were those whom the 
villagers believed were sent by chief Vaaltyn B to spy and disrupt the meetings. There 
were also those who were believed to be working hand in hand with chief Vaaltyn B and 
said to benefit from the relationship. There was often potential for clashes. As a 
researcher I had to emphasize the importance of tolerance of each person’s perceptions. 
The participants spoke both Ndebele and Northern Sotho. As a result the interviews 
were conducted in both languages. The strength of conducting group interviews was 
that I was able to witness the emotion people attached to their responses about the 
current chief Vaaltyn B, the dispute, mining in the area, local governance and the 
institution of traditional leadership. The group interviews also allowed observation of 
the groups’ social interaction, the level of transparency and social elements of age and 
gender. Even though there were dominant voices amongst the groups, the villagers 
were not reserved about their views and were not threatened to oppose someone when 
they felt their opinions were being unacceptably generalised. Often when a participant 
responded to a question a chorus would either join to say ‘no’, throwing their hands in 
the air as a gesture of disagreement or clapping in agreement. It was also interesting to 
observe that both men and women contributed equally to the interviews. There were no 
obvious gendered power struggles. Though not an initial choice for data acquisition, the 
group interviews proved to be illuminating and rich with regards to the legitimacy of 
the current chief Vaaltyn B and about the legitimacy of chieftainship as an institution. 
Chapter six focuses on how the institution of traditional leadership has been analysed in 
relation to democratic institutions. It  concludes the study by arguing that being able to 
vote for a candidate to take office does not guarantee accountability, consultation, 
honesty, transparency, equality and the trickle down of economic benefits to the people. 
On the other hand it also argues that the dismissal of the institution of traditional 
leadership on the basis that chiefs are not consistent with the principles of democracy 
or the simple fact that their position is hereditary is problematic.  
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This thesis explores through the perspective of the people in Vaaltyn, the ambiguities of 
the institution in contemporary South Africa. There have been areas where 
chieftainship has been oppressive to people. However there have also been cases where 
chieftainship provides an alternative in areas where the local government has not yet 
entrenched itself or where local governance is present but inefficient due to lack of 
funds, incompetence and corruption.61 The study suggests that the question of why 
chieftainship remains legitimate has to be explored case by case, taking into account 
each area’s historical and contemporary context before generalisations or suggestions 
about discarding the institution of chieftainship can be made.    
The theoretical meaning of the concepts used in this thesis are discussed as each 
chapter proceeds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
61 Oomen, B. (2002). ‘Chiefs! Law, Power and Culture in contemporary South Africa.’ Leiden: University of 
Leiden 
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Chapter 2 
The interface between tradition and modernity: An outline of the succession 
dispute between chief Vaaltyn A and Vaaltyn B 
 
This chapter outlines the life histories of the Kekana chiefs who are in contention for 
authority. The chapter uses oral life histories, written testimonies and participant 
observation to compare the two contenders. The focus is on their personality, their 
lineage, where they grew up, their schooling, beliefs, tribal councils and their respective 
social settings. It explicates how individual personality and background determines the 
allocation of authority in their case. It argues that the local government gave recognition 
to Vaaltyn B because his personality, background, and tribal council guaranteed an easy 
working relationship. This kind of relationship between chieftainship and local 
government is necessary, especially if it promises material, political and economic 
benefits such as the ones that are entered into with mining houses.  
Chiefly lineage of Vaaltyn A and Vaaltyn B 
Among other elements that make the history of the area of Vaaltyn coincide with that of 
other South African chiefdoms, is the issue of succession disputes. The disputes are not 
only a result of past colonial and apartheid policies but also a result of the complex 
dynamics of culture.  Below is how oral evidence suggests the Mokopane chieftainship 
developed.62 
 
 
                                                             
62
 This list includes both the chiefs and the regents of the Kekana chieftainship. De Beer, F, (1986). 
‘Groepsgebondenheid in die familie- opvolgings- en erfreg van die Noord Ndebele.’ PhD Thesis. Pretoria: 
Univesiteit van Pretoria, has helped extensively to construct this structure and outline this genealogy. 
Some of the names may be spelled incorrectly since most of my informants seemed to have different ways 
of pronouncing the names. For the purpose of this chapter, I will start a discussion from the chieftainship 
of Bernard Kekana. 
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Moghombane Setwamadi I (Sejwamadi) 
↓ 
Magude (Mongeni) 
↓ 
Moghombane II 
↓ 
Ntata 
↓ 
Vaaltyn (Likxhobo) d. 1910 
↓ 
Moshupya (Klaas) (regent) d. 1919 
↓ 
Makhubuketja (regent)  
↓ 
Bernard Kekana  
↓ 
Piet Gojela Kekana (regent, d 1961) 
↓ 
Molalakgori (regent, late 1961) 
↓ 
Alfred Lesiba Kekana 
↓ 
Vaaltyn Lesiba Kekana 
↓ 
Vaaltyn Lesiba Kekana 
 
Bernard was the son of Vaaltyn Lixhobo whose regency came to an end after his death 
in 1910. Bernard could not immediately take over as he was still young at the time. 
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Bernard’s half brother, Klaas Mushupya therefore assumed authority as a regent. He 
was regent until he died in 1919. Makhubuketja then became a regent. Makhubuketja 
sent Bernard to school to prepare him for the day that he would become chief. Bernard 
took over from him in 1923. By then, he was already married to his first wife nna 
Monama. He had to marry the principal wife Josephine who would give birth to the heir. 
However she died in childbirth. It is believed that Bernard died after he was poisoned 
by Jan Petros (his father’s half brother). Piet Gojela (Bernard’s half brother) took over as 
regent from May 1934. Gojela was declared the guardian of Bernard’s ten year old son, 
Alfred. According to De Beer63 it was also his responsibility to ensure that when Alfred 
grew older he would marry the rightful principal wife who would produce the heir.  
However, from the outset Gojela was manipulated by Jan Petros and that introduced 
some tensions into the royal family with regard to his position in matters of the 
chieftainship. Gojela seems to have had no intention of handing over the regency and 
held his position until he died on the 12th October 1961. According to De Beer,64 on the 
day after Gojela’s death, Molalakgori was proclaimed by some members of the lineage as 
regent.  
There were already divisions within the chiefly family about who should take over the 
regency on behalf of Alfred. One faction was in favour of Molalakgori and another 
‘rightfully’65 in favour of Alfred’s brother. Molalakgori took over as regent on the 13th 
October 1961. He is father to the current chief Vaaltyn B. Molalakgori is known for being 
on good terms with the local commissioner during the apartheid era and the democratic 
government in the later years. 66 It was suggested that Alfred marry Salome nna Langa 
                                                             
63 De Beer, F. (1986). ‘Groepsgebondenheid in die familie- opvolgings- en erfreg van die Noord Ndebele’  p. 
16 
64 Ibid 
65 De Beer shows according to Ndebele tradition that Alfred’s younger brother was supposed to take over 
as a regent instead of Molalakgori, the uncle.  
66 After Molalakgori had succeeded in his endeavour to be regent, the tribal council members who 
belonged to the rival faction become aware that Molalakgori was not representing the needs of the tribal 
council as a whole. Therefore, in 1973 the rival tribal council chased him away for being tyrannical in 
matters of chieftainship. Van Niekerk, the Commissioner at the time, defended Molalakgori and urged that 
he be reinstated. It is also mentioned that Van Niekerk provided Molalakgori with police’s protection. This 
to some extant elucidates the long relationship that Molalakgori had with the apartheid state. Later this 
relationship paved the way for his involvement in the democratic Transitional Local Councils.  
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who would give birth to the heir. Salome according to De Beer was from Lekalaka, 
Majaneng, or the Kekana tribe, from which according to tradition the principal wife had 
to come. The tribal council in contention for the chieftainship said that: 
Salome got the shock of her life when she realised that it was Molalakgori, the 
old man himself who had come to marry her. Salome refused his solicitations 
thus Molalakgori reclaimed the bridal cows without notifying the council to 
marry Naomi. Now, this is totally against our tradition because the principal 
wife lobola protocol entails that one who wishes to marry the principal wife 
goes straight to the chief to ask for permission. But Molalakgori instead went 
and consulted with an old woman from the village.67 
 
Molalakgori proposed marriage to Naomi (mother of the current chief, Vaaltyn B) after 
he was rejected by Salome, the daughter of Langa. Naomi, according to the unrecognised 
tribal council, came from Langa, Mapela. Jackson claims that Naomi came from the 
Matlhogo Langa Ndebele chiefdom).68 Either way, the tribal council that is not 
recognised by the government argued that Naomi was not from the appropriate family 
because the principal wife must come from the Langa and Kekana of Moletlane, 
Zebediela. Alfred Kekana69 declared that: ‘Naomi was an ordinary girl from an ordinary 
family. She was not the candle wife.  His father was a Khalanga “a foreigner”. She 
married Molalakgori with intentions to benefit from the chief’s finances and Molalakgori 
married her for himself”. Molalakgori complicated the state of affairs by sleeping with 
Naomi and together they had three children.  
 
                                                             
67  Unrecognised tribal council, interviewed by Skosana, D. Dr. Esterhuysen, A. Prof. Bonner, P. Dr. 
Lekgoathi, S. at Vaaltyn, 1 August 2009.    
68 Jackson A. (1983). ‘The Ndebele of Langa’ Department of co-operation and development, Ethnological 
Publication No. 54 Pretoria, Government Printer, p. 125. 
69 Unrecognised tribal council, interviewed by Skosana, D. Dr. Esterhuysen, A. Prof. Bonner, P. Dr. 
Lekgoathi, S. at Vaaltyn, 1 August 2009.    
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 When Vaaltyn B’s tribal council70 was asked about the motivation behind Molalakgori’s 
actions, they stated that Alfred was impotent and therefore Molalakgori was chosen to 
have children on his behalf.71 When asked if there were any blood tests to attest to this 
and who fathered the children belonging to Alfred’s first wife, including Vaaltyn A, Jeff 
Kekana’s response was that: ‘These are the children of councillor Kgathola [who] had 
once been caught sneaking out of the chief’s wife’s compound by women who would be 
sweeping the yard in the early morning.’ For the formally recognised tribal council, this 
verified their claim that the children of Nna Thabethe were not fathered by Alfred. It is 
important to note that even if Alfred were impotent, according to De Beer, in the 
Ndebele culture of succession, Molalakgori who was an uncle to the late chief Alfred was 
not supposed to raise up seed on behalf of Alfred. Despite this, Molalakgori fathered 
chief Vaaltyn B who was born in 1974.72 
Gojela (a member of the chieftly family) praised Molalakgori’s actions when he stated 
that: ‘You must know that some of the senior councillors were wise, such as 
Molalakgori, immediately when a baby is born one has to have a certificate and you got 
to inform the Commissioner that a chief has been born. This is how I think Molalakgori 
worked things. So that when chief Alfred dies there is no confusion.’73 
Another perspective is that since Molalakgori had a good relationship with the Native 
Commissioner and the government it would not have been difficult for him to submit a 
birth certificate on behalf of Vaaltyn B to the government. In addition, naming his son 
                                                             
70 I will sometimes refer to Vaaltyn A and his tribal council who are contending for chieftainship as 
‘unrecognised’. This is because they were not formally recognised by the government as opposed to 
Vaaltyn B and his tribal council who were given recognition in 2003. 
71  Jeff Kekana, Madimetsa Lekalakala and David Phahladira, (the tribal council members in office) 
interviewed by D. Skosana, Prof Bonner P. and Dr. Lekgoathi, P. at Vaaltyn, 18 September 2009 
72 De Beer, F. (1986). ‘Groepsgebondenheid in die familie- opvolgings- en erfreg van die Noord Ndebele.’ PhD 
Thesis. p 1 
73  Gojela Kekana, interview by D. Skosana, Prof. Bonner, P. and Dr. Lekgoathi, P. with Mr at Mogalakwena 
Municipality, 18 July 2009  
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Vaaltyn, paved the way for some confusion which would later be ‘resolved’ by the 
government when they inaugurated Vaaltyn B as chief of the Kekana.  
 
The early lives of both the contending chiefs 
Vaaltyn A was born in the royal kraal of Kekana Vaaltyn in 1964. The son of the first 
wife whom the chief had chosen himself, he was raised no differently from his three 
siblings. This was because his mother was not the principal wife. Thus there was no 
expectation that he would one day be chief. When asked about his childhood and 
schooling, he shut his eyes, his head facing upwards and slowly recounted:   
I attended primary eh, at the time it was sub A. I went to Vaaltyn Primary 
School in 1971. And then 71, 72, 73, eh, I was still at primary because at the 
time one used to fail standards, then you pass, then you fail and so on and so 
on, because we were still young and also mischievous. At times we would skip 
school while others are attending. You busy munching vetkoeks(fat cakes) 
there; they would call on the register, Vaaltyn! Vaaltyn! Only to find that I have 
ran away. Then I passed and went to attend at Moshupsa, for standard 3. I then 
went to Bakenberg at the school in Rooivaal named Mabusela Primary. I spent 
most of my school life there. I then continued in 86, 87, I was in form 2, 88, 
form 3, 89, form 4. In 1990 I failed form 4. In 1991, I failed again. In 1992 I 
passed form 4 then I went to do my matric. Then in 1993 I failed. In 1994 I 
failed- Ai! Then I came back to do some supplements of the subjects that I had 
failed. Then I got some E’s and A’s here and there.74 
 
The chiefly family then decided to send him to Boaparankwe College75 located in Marble 
Hall where he completed his studies and returned to Vaaltyn thereafter. Vaaltyn A 
mentioned that he had never become involved in politics because he thought it would 
delay his studies which he was already struggling to complete.   
On the other side, Vaaltyn B was also born in the Kekana chiefly kraal a decade later 
than Vaaltyn A, in 1974. Since his mother (Naomi) was a contested principal wife, the 
                                                             
74 Vaaltyn A, interview by Dineo Skosana at Vaaltyn, 15 September 2011  
75 Boaparankwe is a school which is attended by the children of the chiefs and headman. It is aimed at 
teaching children of chiefs and headman administrative and people skills.  
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unrecognised tribal council chased them away from the village, along with his father, 
Molalakgori. They believed Naomi must have had ulterior motives in agreeing to marry 
the old man Molalakgori. The chiefly family said to Molalakgori suspiciously: ‘as the 
uncle of the chief, how can you go to the house of the chiefly family, when you are the 
father? This shows that you and that woman had relations before’. They sent the woman 
back to her home in Langa Mapela.76 
In Mapela (Langa), Vaaltyn B, his siblings and mother stayed with his maternal uncle 
and he attended school at Mmantotolo.77  As compared to Vaaltyn B, he did not attend 
Boaparankwe and the unrecognised tribal council divulged that he did not go to the 
initiation school either. Abram Kekana openly said that ‘He is not circumcised’.78  In 
their study about methodological challenges encountered when studying traditions 
such as initiation, Matobo, Makatsa and Obioha (2009) state that initiation ‘provided 
basic education to the initiates. Boys were provided with economic knowledge, skills in 
negotiations and in how to be good leader in their societies.’79 Vaaltyn II did not 
experience the teachings of an initiation school. This further explains why the 
unrecognised tribal council perceived him as in possession of modern traits which they 
believe do not make up an ‘authentic’ chief. 
Mapela, the area which Vaaltyn B comes from, is relatively developed as compared to 
Vaaltyn. The Langa are of Northern Ndebele descent. However they are surrounded by 
the Pedi. This may explain why chief Vaaltyn B is said to be more familiar with Pedi than 
Northern Ndebele. When asked about other details of his life, such as what his interests 
at school were and whether he was ever involved in politics, Jeff Kekana’s response was 
                                                             
76  Jeff Kekana, Madimetsa Lekalakala and David Phahladira, (the tribal council members in office) 
interviewed by D. Skosana, Prof Bonner P. and Dr. Lekgoathi, P. at Vaaltyn, 18 September 2009  
77 The interview was conducted with Jeff Kekana who is the spokesperson and uncle of the current chief.  
As a result he could not remember details such as where Vaaltyn attended his primary, secondary or his 
high school. Mmantotolo is the only school he could remember Vaaltyn B attending. 
78 Jeff Kekana, Madimetsa Lekalakala and David Phahladira, (the tribal council members in office) 
interviewed by D. Skosana, Prof Bonner P. and Dr. Lekgoathi, P. at Vaaltyn, 18 September 2009 
79 Matobo T. , Makatsa M. and Obioha. E. (2009). ‘Continuity in the Traditional Initiation Practice of Boys 
and Girls in Contemporary Southern Africa Society’, Studies of Tribes Tribals, 7(2): 105-113 p. 106 
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that: ‘I would not know because when he was studying we did not know him’. He was 
fetched by Molalakgori’s first wife after chief Alfred died in the year 2000. He was then 
26 years old. He had been working at the then Johannesburg Airport as a driver for Avis. 
He was informed after the funeral by some of the councillors that he was the next chief. 
Jeff Kekana stated that ‘We discussed everything with him until he was convinced that 
he is a chief.’80 De Beer suggests that in cases where the principal wife is contested ‘the 
male offspring are then not considered to be the successor to their father’s throne 
(sic)’.81 Arguably, this suggests that Vaaltyn B is not the legitimate chief.   
 
The traditional vs. the modern chief 
‘The literal definition of tradition comes from the Latin verb tradere meaning to 
transmit, to give up, or to give over. Traditio indicates the process by which something 
is transmitted; traditum refers to the thing transmitted’82 There has been no consensus 
about what the term tradition refers to or how it differs from custom, nor about 
whether it should prevail or wither away. Even so, there has been some agreement with 
David Gross’s definition that tradition refers to a ‘set of practises, beliefs or mode of 
thinking that is passed down from one generation to another.’83 Arguably, there has also 
been a tendency to define tradition in relation to what it ‘confronts’, that is, modernity. 
Gerard Delante also observes a tendency to define ‘modernity by reference to the 
critique of tradition’.84 The latter has been widely debated among scholars of different 
disciplines. This chapter will refrain from using the term modernity with reference to 
                                                             
80 Jeff Kekana, Madimetsa Lekalakala and David Phahladira, (the tribal council members in office) 
interviewed by D. Skosana, Prof Bonner P. and Dr. Lekgoathi, P. at Vaaltyn, 18 September 2009 
81 De Beer, F. (1986). ‘Groepsgebondenheid in die familie- opvolgings- en erfreg van die Noord Ndebele.’ PhD 
Thesis. p. 3 
82 Gross, D. (1992). ‘The Past and its Ruins: Tradition and the critique of Modernity.’ Massachusetts: 
University of Massachusetts Press. p. 9 
83 See Gross, D. (1992).  ‘The Past and its Ruins: Tradition and the critique of Modernity.’ p. 8 
84 Delante, G. (1999). ‘Social theory in a changing world’. Cambridge: Polity Press. p. 3, and Hobsbawm E,  
and Ranger, T., O. (2003). ‘The invention of tradition’. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 1-3 
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the period which was characterised by the secularization of certain forms of power, 
industrialization, rationalization and the scientific revolution.85 It will instead adapt a 
working definition which defines modernity as an era that is characterized, among 
other things, by a shift in meaning and engagement with ideas, beliefs, practices, 
processes and social institutions. 
A modern chief from this perspective advocates or practices a departure from 
traditional styles and values and his aspirations are more contemporary in that they are 
geared towards participating in the modern economy. On the contrary, a traditional 
chief, although he may have varying degrees of modern traits, embraces past patterns of 
doing things. Very importantly, this suggests that the concepts modern and traditional 
cannot be polarized. Gusfield points out that the relations between the traditional and 
the modern do not necessarily involve displacement, conflict, or exclusiveness.86 
Modern and traditional are overlapping articulating concepts and experiences. 
Therefore, this chapter takes into consideration the complexity of both terms and 
suggests that the persona of both chiefs may be fluid but that, they possess traits and 
perform certain practices that may be distinguished with being modern or traditional.  
 
 In order to interview chief Vaaltyn A, we87 drove down on the semi tarred yet 
predominantly gravel routes of Vaaltyn. The sun shone brightly, with birds flying on the 
clear skies in an area not as resourced with what is associated with developed urban 
areas. Donkey carts sound thunderous; shepherds and cattle-herds wander the roads; 
young and old women sweep out the yards; ordinary people walk along foot paths: 
these are some of the sights that Vaaltyn still offers. It is common for both old women 
and men to stop and loudly pass greetings to fellow villagers. Often these greetings are 
accompanied by gossip and an exchange of personal or village related information.  
                                                             
85 See, Weber, M. (1946). ‘Essays in Sociology’. New York: Free Press, Berman, M. (1982). ‘All That Is Solid 
Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity.’ New York:  
86 Gusfield, J, R. (1967). Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change. 
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 72(4). pp. 351-362. The University of Chicago Press 
 
87 I was accompanied by Prof. Bonner, P, Dr. Esterhuysen, A and Dr. Lekgoathi. P  
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Chief Vaaltyn A’s home is positioned in the tradition of the Ndebele, Tswana or the Zulu 
homesteads in earlier centuries. The huts are laid out in circular manner with the 
structures built in what Adam Kuper observed to be a horseshoe like format.88 This 
arrangement positioned the chief’s hut at the centre of the homestead, with huts 
belonging to members of the chiefdom surrounding him. Similar to the ‘horseshoe’ 
structure, chief Vaaltyn A’s house is a four cornered brick laid house positioned at the 
centre bottom of the mountain. On the right hand side of the chief’s house is the house 
built for the principal wife while on the left hand side, is the house belonging to the 
Kekana family’s traditional healer. At the entrance of chief Vaaltyn A’s home, lies a small 
graveyard with the tombstones of the late chiefs of the Kekana. Adam Kuper observed a 
similar pattern among other Nguni chiefdoms indicating that often ‘the chief’s hut is 
placed at the apex of the settlement. The sacred elements of the settlement - graves of 
ancestors, places of sacrifice - are also concentrated there’89. He suggests that ‘this 
domestic settlement forms the crucial unit in the economy, kinship system and regional 
political organisation; and that its layout is a symbolic representation of the principles 
of the socio-cosmic system.’90 It could also be said that the presence of the chief’s house 
at the centre of the chiefdom that is under his authority is comforting to his subjects. His 
positioning within close proximity to his subjects makes him accessible and it can also 
be argued that it allows him to have a clear understanding of what his subject’s 
concerns are.91  
 We were received by the tribal council, which was seated in a traditional African 
circular manner. Most of the council members walked to the meeting, while a few cycled 
to the royal house. The council is comprised predominantly of elderly men who were 
dressed in blue, others in orange, overalls, while others matched overall jackets with 
casual pants or jeans. Those in shirts, wore the sleeves rolled up and shirt tails loosely 
                                                             
88 Kuper, A. (1993). The ‘House’ and Zulu Political Structure in the Nineteenth Century. The Journal of 
African History. Vol. 34(3), pp. 469-487. p 474 
89 Ibid 
90 Ibid, p 473 
91 The positioning of the chiefs house seemed to be of concern for both the tribal councils throughout the 
interviews. I will discuss this later in the thesis. 
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hanging out of their trousers. A few wore suit jackets with un-matching trousers. Most 
of them wore hats which they held tightly close to their chests as they bowed to greet 
the council and then hung the hats on their knees during the interview. Taking off a hat 
is a gesture that illustrates respect to the chief and the royal kraal. The women were 
seated in the shade within the circle but separate from the men. They wore knee length 
skirts, their shoulders and heads covered. We sat across a four legged plastic table, 
which was covered with a white satin cloth while the tribal council sat on chairs that are 
usually used for school learners. Those who were without seats sat on coca-cola crates. 
The women sat on hand-made mats or on the ground. 
We did not meet the chief at first even though we spoke to his tribal council. On the 
second interview with the tribal council, chief Vaaltyn A sat in a corner quietly, while 
the tribal council spoke on his behalf. It appears to be common for the tribal council to 
converse on behalf of the chief. The tribal council supporting Vaaltyn A out-numbers the 
Vaaltyn B tribal council.92 Vaaltyn A’s tribal council predominantly comprises of old 
men. There are a few young men in the council who are also members of SANCO. 
Women of varying ages also sit in the tribal council. Some of these women are the 
Kgadis (the chief’s sisters and paternal aunts) whose core role is to approve the 
principal wife. They have the power either to approve or to contest a proposed principal 
wife. Both men and women in the tribal council are residents of Vaaltyn. Most of the 
council’s elderly have retired while the majority of the young men and women were 
unemployed.  
 The interviews were carried out in Northern Ndebele. The council urged the 
respondents to converse in Northern Ndebele. We were informed towards the end of 
the interviews that it is not usual according to Ndebele culture to see the chief or enter 
his space without paying homage. As a result we offered a skinned sheep on our 
subsequent visit. It is not uncommon for visitors to be expected to pay a tribute to the 
chief before seeing or speaking to him in African chiefdoms.  
                                                             
92 On the interview with Joseph Kekana, 15 September 2011, he mentioned that the tribal council of the 
incumbent chief Vaaltyn B comprise of 5 men. This is very less as compared to Vaaltyn A tribal council. 
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On the other side of the chiefly conflict, we met the tribal council of the chief who is 
recognised by the government at Protea Hotel Mokopane. Chief Vaaltyn B was absent 
from all of our meetings. In much the same way as the tribal council in contention for 
the chieftainship, Vaaltyn B’s tribal council spoke on his behalf. The three men wore 
suits with their shirts neatly tucked in. We set on leather chairs, around a shiny wooden 
table in the hotel’s conference room. The interview was carried out in Northern Sotho. 
In most cases, the tribal councillors would respond in both Northern Sotho and English. 
Mocks Mokhonoana93 who sits on the tribal council of the unrecognised chief, mocked 
Vaaltyn B declaring that: ‘On the day of the inauguration, the presenters of Radio 
Thobela said to him in disbelief ‘you are a Ndebele chief but you do not know Northern 
Ndebele’? Then he was very raw, did not know a word’.94 Mr Joseph Kekana mentioned 
in his defence when asked about Vaaltyn B’s ability to speak Northern Ndebele that: ‘He 
speaks Pedi because he grew up amongst the Pedi, but he now speaks Ndebele as 
well.’95 
Apart from genealogical reasons and the fact that Vaaltyn B and his tribal council did 
not follow what is considered to be ‘the proper protocol of Northern Ndebele culture’, a 
few more considerations affirmed the assertion of Vaaltyn A’s tribal council that chief 
Vaaltyn B was not an authentic chief. Chief Vaaltyn B does not stay in the village. It was 
mentioned that he stays in town in a house bought for him by the mines.96 Joseph 
Kekana claimed during one of the interviews that he stays in town because of ‘not being 
able to get a place in the community’. Joseph Kekana insinuated that Vaaltyn B does not 
stay in the village because he could not find a suitable house for himself. The reality is 
that he does not stay in Vaaltyn not only because his mortgage is paid for by the 
                                                             
93 Mocks is an assumed name which translates to his surname Mokhonoana. He belongs to the faction of 
the family who are the intermediaries. He is the tribal council’s speaker. He is a relatively successful 
owner of a small grocery shop and a liquor store. He is the writer of the memorandum and an activist 
against municipal demarcation discussed in the next chapter.  
94 Vaaltyn A and Mocks Mokhonoana, interview by Dineo Skosana at Vaaltyn, 15 September 2011  
95 Joseph Kekana, interview by Dineo Skosana at Vaaltyn, 15 September 2011  
96 Jeff Kekana, Madimetsa Lekalakala and David Phahladira, (the tribal council members in office) 
interviewed by D. Skosana, Prof Bonner P. and Dr. Lekgoathi, P. at Vaaltyn, 18 September 2009  
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Platinum Reef Mine but also because he could not risk going back to the community 
which is comprised of the rival tribal council members who once chased him away.  He 
also does not speak Northern Ndebele. He is a Christian but does not attend church, 
though his tribal council are members of Pentecostal churches. This is different from the 
majority of the Vaaltyn and Mokopane communities, Vaaltyn A and his tribal council, the 
majority of whom are members of the Zion Christian Church. In addition, Vaaltyn B 
grew up in the township of Mahwelereng. This is where his family took refuge when he 
was three months old before they moved to the Langa village under the guardianship of 
his paternal uncle. As a result Vaaltyn B is regarded by the rival tribal council as an 
outsider, who has imposed himself on a chiefdom that does not know him.97  
This section of the chapter has illuminated the contrasting social contexts of the 
contending Kekana tribal councils in order to illustrate that the social setting 
determines whether a group or an individual continues being traditional or gives up 
what is considered tradition to follow modern ways of doing things. The social setting 
also determines the manner in which tradition is modified in a modern context.  In 
other words one could say that it is not surprising that Vaaltyn A and his tribal council 
still conform to Northern Ndebele tradition, even though this tradition may have been 
modified. This is because the social setting in Vaaltyn is relatively favourable for them to 
preserve Northern Ndebele practises such as slaughtering. Slaughtering in Vaaltyn B’s 
house located in the suburbs may be difficult given the by-laws and dynamics in 
suburbs. This allows one to perhaps conclude that Vaaltyn B’s upbringing in 
Mahwelereng Township and later amongst his Pedi speaking family in Langa shaped the 
type of chief he is, how he engages with Northern Ndebele tradition and arguably and 
most importantly, paved the way for him with the help of his father’s historical 
relationship to successive local governments, to be appointed by the democratic 
government as chief instead of Vaaltyn B. 
 
 
 
                                                             
97 These aspects will be discussed again on chapter 5. 
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Northern Ndebele culture  
As discussed in the first chapter, the history and origins of the Northern Ndebele is 
widely contested. Isabel Hofmeyr remarks that ‘ethnic categories are not rigid, 
particularly in the nineteenth century Transvaal where constant interaction amongst 
societies ensured a fluid sense of ethnic definition.’98 Likewise, Van Warmelo observed 
the influence of Pedi identity on the Northern Ndebele and argued that the Southern 
Ndebele were more ‘authentic since they remained culturally conservative as opposed 
to their Northern counterparts’99 Van Wyk and Ziervogel maintained that the language 
spoken by the Northern and Southern Ndebele, distinguished these two groups.100 Their 
traditional garments and the structure of their houses also set them apart.101 During an 
interview with Lucky Kekana,102 she pointed that the Kekana, Northern Ndebele are 
endogamous, which differentiates them from the Southern Ndebele who marry outside 
their social units.  
The following extracts from the interviews with the contending tribal councils illustrate 
some aspects of Northern Ndebele culture and the background and social setting of both 
the chiefs and how their respective tribal councils have shaped and how they 
internalise, interpret and modify Northern Ndebele culture. The extracts illustrate the 
difference between the two chiefs, Vaaltyn A and Vaaltyn B and their tribal councils.  
When asked about the rituals that are performed before the inauguration of the chief, 
the senior tribal council of the unrecognised chief, Abram Kekana explained that: 
In our tradition when a chief is sworn in we say ‘uyokhandiswa boloko’, the 
direct translation means to step on the cow dung. The councillors who 
                                                             
98 Hofmeyr, I. (1993). ‘We spend our years as a tale that is untold.’ Pg 18-19 
99 Van Warmelo, J. (1930). Transvaal Ndebele Texts. South Africa:  Ethological Publications. 
100 Van Wyk, (1966), p 36 and  Zietvogel, (1969), p 36 
101 See for instance, Schneider, E, A. (1997). ‘Ndebele’. New York: Rosen Publishing Group 
102 Lucky Kekana interviewed by Skosana, at Vaaltyn, 16 August 2009.     
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contributed cows for the principal wife are called. Then the chief gets to wear 
the skin of an animal, ‘the leopard’s skin’.103  
 
Mocks Mokhonoana added that:  
 
The chief who is being inaugurated is taken to the grave of the chief whom he 
has been named after or succeeding to announce that he is taking over. His face 
is smeared with some fat. This is done in order to make a connection with the 
ancestors. This is almost similar to the Bible when David was blessed by 
Samuel.104 
 
 He also added that most rituals are carried out in private on the day before the 
inauguration and that the remaining practices such as slaughtering are done on the day 
of the inauguration. On the day of the installation of the chief, representatives of the 
government, guests, chiefs and villagers are invited to witness the ceremony. They are 
offered food and traditional beer.   
Mocks stated that previously, older men would go and hunt a leopard and once they had 
killed it, they would remove its skin and place it in a position exposing it to the sun so 
that it could dry out. After some days it would be cut up to fit the successor. The 
traditional healer would thereafter bless it using her ancestral powers. By contrast 
when asked about how the skin is traditionally prepared before it can be worn by the 
chief, Joseph Kekana (who sits and speaks on behalf of the Vaaltyn B tribal council) 
explained that: ‘in our culture we don’t really pray but now I do pray. Traditionally, we 
don’t pray for it, we call the ancestors.’105 Here he implied that they no longer prepare 
the skin in the same manner as in the past, because of their conversion to Christianity. 
There is both association and separation at different times in Joseph Kekana’s responses 
from the Northern Ndebele traditional way of doing things. This is not unusual 
considering that identity is fluid. We shall see in the next extracts from the interviews, 
how Vaaltyn B and his tribal council move between two cultures. This should not imply 
                                                             
103
 Unrecognised tribal council, interviewed by Skosana, Dr. D. Esterhuysen, A. Prof. Bonner, P. Dr. 
Lekgoathi, S. at Vaaltyn, 16 August 2009.     
104
 ibid 
105 Joseph Kekana, interview by Dineo Skosana at Vaaltyn, 15 September 2011  
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that the rival Vaaltyn A and his tribal council are not caught up in a similar position, but 
rather that Vaaltyn A’s background, his tribal council and their context and 
surroundings allow them to lean more towards tradition and traditional identity as 
opposed to a Christian and modern identity. It could also be argued that the dispute 
itself compels them to lean towards traditional identity since it deems them as perhaps 
more authentic. 
When asked whether the rituals were practised during the inauguration of Vaaltyn B. 
Mock’s response was: 
Whose grave will he go to because the chief’s grave is here? Vaaltyn B was 
sworn in in a street-wise manner. They did not do the rituals. They just meet at 
the stadium. One other thing is that most of the things are supposed to be done 
here in the royal kraal then from there; we can go to the stadium just to show 
people that the chief is being sworn in. 
  
Mrs Lucky Kekana, a member of the royal family, was also eager to voice her views on 
Vaaltyn B and his inauguration ceremony. In response to the question of what happens 
when a chief is inaugurated, she exclaimed: 
 I will tell you. We cook the whole week then other women wash dishes. We 
borrow from our neighbours, chairs, tables, you name them. We call all the 
chiefs from Zebediela and elsewhere. Now, I wonder if all this happened when 
the so-called chief was inaugurated. This so called chief was inaugurated on a 
soccer field. Women who are fond of eating went to cook. We did not go. We 
relaxed around the house. Nobody went to dance for him. What kind of a chief 
is that? He has never set his foot here. When he is asked if he knows us, his 
response is no! And so is our response. If he dies he cannot be buried in the 
chief’s grave yard. He will be buried in the public graveyards with everyone.106  
 
Joseph Kekana’s description of the inauguration process is in many ways different from 
that described by the unrecognised tribal council. When the same question was asked 
about what rituals were performed when Vaaltyn B was inaugurated, Joseph Kekana’s 
response was that, ‘when we installed him we were visited by the Premier of the 
                                                             
106 Unrecognised tribal council, interviewed by Skosana, Dr. D. Esterhuysen, A. Prof. Bonner, P. Dr. 
Lekgoathi, S. at Vaaltyn, 16 August 2009.     
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Province, the chairperson of the chiefs in the Limpopo Province and the local 
government.’107 He proceeded to explain that on the actual day, participants carried 
knobkerries, assegais, and shields and everyone was dressed in skins and the virgins 
were also there. They danced endlessly while the chief was watching so that if he was 
interested he could choose one among them. These were women from Mapela and 
Zebediela, where the principal wife traditionally comes from. Someone from Mapela, 
will carry the spear, shield and the animal skin which will be given to the chief. He 
added that all these things are bought.108 This is contrary to the olden days in which the 
utensils needed for the inauguration would be made by members of the chiefly family or 
would be passed down from generation to generation. He also revealed that the chief 
would be dressed up in an animal skin in front of the government officials, chiefly family 
and a cameraman, who are the witnesses. In order to give some clarity, Joseph Kekana 
explained that:  
We buy the skin of a leopard, so because the skin of a leopard is now scarce, we 
got it from Canada - somewhere in Canada. They brought it; they were 
contributing because they have activities in our area. They own mines. So they 
are the ones who bought the skin for us. The Canadians.109 
 
The mining activities in Vaaltyn altered the stakes for the chieftainship and for the 
local state. In order for there to be a non-contentious relationship with the mining 
concession company, the chief had to be reasonably sophisticated, if not 
professional. Certainly the negotiations between the chief, the local and provincial 
government and the mine would have had to be conducted with quite a high level of 
understanding.110 Thus I suggest that the personality, of chief Vaaltyn B, his 
background and tribal council played a role in legitimizing him.  
                                                             
107 Joseph Kekana, interview by Dineo Skosana at Vaaltyn, 15 September 2011  
108 Jeff Kekana was speaking wistfully about the day of the inauguration. He narrated the ideal procedures 
of the inauguration and at the end of his description his stated that the afore mentioned customs did not 
happen. 
109 Ibid 
110 This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the backgrounds of both contending chiefs, Vaaltyn A and B, 
with respect to their lineage, where they were born, their tribal councils and their social 
settings. I have argued that these social categories help us understand the two 
personalities in contention for chieftainship. From probing their personalities, I have 
suggested that we get a sense of why the government opted to give recognition to 
Vaaltyn B. This however, is not merely to reduce the determination of the allocation of 
power to personality. Other factors clearly played a role, such as the fact that the 
current chief‘s father was the chief’s representative in the Commissioner’s office during 
the apartheid era.  Thereafter he became the chief’s representative in the Transitional 
Local Council. This chapter has argued that the fact that Vaaltyn B was fathered by 
Molalakgori, who was well connected with the state, in addition to his modern traits, 
paved the way for him to be legitimized. Although, in contrast, for the people in Vaaltyn, 
the current chief Vaaltyn B remains illegitimate.  
Chieftainship is hereditary. However in Vaaltyn, chieftainship was awarded to the 
faction which appears to promise a relatively easier relationship. It is necessary for a 
chieftain and local government to have some form of understanding since the area of 
Vaaltyn is continuously explored by mining houses. The benefits that accompany mining 
cannot be enjoyed unless a chieftain, local government and Mining houses establish 
some consensus.   
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Chapter 3 
Boundary determination negotiations within a context of a succession dispute  
The end of the apartheid system paved the way for a democratic era which promised to 
remedy the political, social and economic injustices of the past. Awaited with great 
expectation, the democratic government enacted laws that were intended to integrate a 
racially divided nation characterised by vast economic disparities. The Local 
Government Transitional Act of 1993, the Development Facilitation Act of 1995 and the 
Municipal Demarcation Act of 1998 were among new laws that were crafted during the 
period of the Transitional Government and just after ‘to enable newly elected, fully 
democratic and demarcated municipalities to begin functioning in a democratic and 
development orientated manner.’111 Implementing these laws was not going to be a 
straightforward task in every part of the country, given the intractability of the ‘land 
question’ in South Africa. This chapter explores the process of demarcation and the 
determination of municipalities. Vaaltyn is used to understand the implications and 
challenges of such a process, using oral testimonies and local municipal records. In 
addition, the Vaaltyn case illustrates the complications that are encountered when a 
government enters into boundary-determination negotiations with a chiefly family that 
is divided by issues of succession and hence of incorporation. It demonstrates how the 
dispute provided a platform for certain factions such as the local government and the 
faction whose chieftainship is currently recognised, to form alliances which bring about 
economic, political and personal benefits. Most significantly, this chapter demonstrates 
Ramutsindela and Simson’s observation that boundary disputes are not only about the 
boundary in question but also about opportunities and constraints offered by the 
process of transformation.  
 
 
 
                                                             
111 Naude, W. A. (2001). ‘South Africa’s local government transformation: An economic development 
perspective.’ University of Leipzig Press. p. 1-17. 
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Transformation of the local government  
The Local Government Transitional Act (LGTA) no. 209 of 1993 was the first piece of 
post-apartheid legislation initiated at the local level. Three phases were proposed in this 
Act. These were the,  
Pre- interim phase - described as a period lasting from the publication of LGTA to 
the date of elections for the transitional local councils. This phase would 
incorporate communities that were previously excluded from local government 
into existing municipalities. The interim phase dated from the elections until the 
implementation of the final arrangement of local government. It was this phase 
that introduced transitional local councils. The final phase defined a period of 
transformation of municipalities and their structures in accordance with 
legislative arrangements112  
The LGTA was criticized among other things for ‘its biased tendency to only focus on 
urban issues.’113  As a result these criticisms lead to the publication of the Proclamation 
R65 of 1995. The proclamation introduced different types of municipalities and councils 
in an attempt to reform local governance and structures in rural and urban areas. These 
were: 
 The ‘Category A municipalities, also known as the Metropolitan municipalities 
introduced Metropolitan Local Councils (MLCS) which had exclusive municipal and 
legislative authority in their areas.  
 The local government in rural areas, also referred to as Category B municipalities 
which were established along with the Transitional Representative Councils (TRep 
Cs) or Transitional Local Councils (TRCs). Generally, these were municipalities that 
were small and shared municipal executive and legislative authority with the 
category C municipalities. 
                                                             
112 Local Government Transitional Act no 209 of 1993 
113 Pycroft, C. (2002). ‘Addressing Rural Poverty: Restructuring Rural Local Government’ Democratising 
Local Government: The South African experiment. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press. p. 111  
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 Category C municipalities, also referred to as the district municipalities were 
established along with district councils who have municipal executive and 
legislative authority in an area that includes more than one municipality.’114  
Chris Pycroft criticised the district municipalities that were constituted as not being in 
possession of sufficient administrative capacity to assume greater responsibility for 
service delivery. He argued that rural areas - and particularly those that were 
administered by the former homelands - were poorly served. He also added that as the 
demarcation board reallocated powers and functions from small urban municipalities to 
district municipalities, these weaknesses would become increasingly apparent. A 
second constraint confronting district municipalities concerned their revenue raising 
powers and their ability to generate sufficient income from revenue to meet the 
infrastructure and service delivery backlogs that existed within rural areas.115 
The introduction of the different types of municipalities and councils was further 
criticized by Pycroft for ‘the lack of administrative, structural and financial capacity to 
fulfil the constitutional and LTGA objectives’. 116 Dominique Wooldridge also observes a 
tendency ’to exclude settlements on the periphery of the metropolis which would lower 
the per capita tax base, and place a strain on service delivery capacity’.117 In an attempt 
to remedy these shortcomings, the White Paper on Local Government then introduced 
the notion of ‘developmental local government’118. In order to achieve these objectives 
                                                             
114 See the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
115 Pycroft, C. (2002). ‘Addressing  Rural Poverty: Restructuring Rural Local Government’, Democratising 
Local Government: The South African experiment. p 116- 117, 
116 Ibid. p.112 
117 Wooldridge, D. (2002). ‘Introducing metropolitan local government in South Africa’. In S. Parnell, E. 
Pieterse, M. Swilling, D. Wooldridge (eds.), Democratising Local Government: the South African experiment. 
Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press. p.  132 
118 Defined as ‘the local government committed to working with citizens and groups within the 
community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the 
quality of their lives’ White Paper on Local Government, March 1998.   
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the White Paper proposed the Municipal Demarcation Act, the Municipal Structures 
Act119 and the Municipal Systems Act.120  
 
The Municipal Demarcation Act 
The Municipal Demarcation Act of 1998 was passed in an attempt to remedy 
underdevelopment, inequalities and border divisions that had been created by the 
colonial and apartheid government in South Africa. The Demarcation Board was 
responsible for redrawing municipal boundaries in order to achieve a balance between 
financial viability and the representation of communities in municipal decision making 
processes. In Pycroft’s understanding this would be done ‘through capturing income- 
generating capacity within each municipal boundary and by ensuring that each 
municipality is small enough to enable a sense of community to develop and to facilitate 
local participation.’121 In order to carry out the objectives of the Act, a Board responsible 
for the determination of municipal boundaries was established. The Act set out to 
redefine metropolitan and district municipal boundaries, establish new local 
municipalities, wards, district management areas and cross boundary municipalities.122 
The criteria for determination of municipal boundaries were:  
 patterns of human settlement 
 employment  
 commuting and spreading trends 
                                                             
119 The Municipal Structure Act 117 of 1998 ‘relieved municipalities of responsibility for the delivery of 
(but not responsibility for) all municipal services. Each Municipality could retain the political authority to 
determine how its functions will be provided. Municipalities would then be free to enter into a range of 
service delivery partnerships to ensure that service was provided in the most cost effective and efficient 
manner.’ Pycroft, C. (1999). ‘Addressing Rural Poverty: Restructuring Rural Local Government’ 
Democratising Local Government: The South African experiment.  p. 116   
120 (Ibid). p. 114. ‘the act seeks to position the district municipalities at the centre of the municipal sphere 
increasing their power and responsibility particularly in rural areas’ 
121 Ibid. 
122 See Section 24 and 25 of the Municipal Demarcation Act. 
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 commercial and industrial linkages 
 the financial and administrative capacity of a municipality 
 financial resources 
 land usage, town and transport planning  
 topographical and environmental characteristics municipal areas 
The procedure for the determination of a municipal boundary involved ‘notifying the 
public and stakeholders of the board’s intentions and inviting members of the public to 
submit the views’.123 Often a due date was set for public discussions prior to the 
beginning of the determination process. To ensure that all the views of stakeholders 
and the public were taken into consideration, the Board appointed a special task team 
to conduct research and read letters written by those concerned. The Board also held 
‘regular meetings with the communities and persons who would be affected by the 
determination process before the final decision could be made’124. Such efforts were 
directed towards ensuring manageability and functionality in the newly proposed 
municipal boundaries. The mayor of Mogalakwena municipality mentioned during the 
interviews that they held consultation meetings with the Potgietersrus community 
members, in which there had never been an agreement with the chiefs and their 
subjects to be incorporated. 125 
What appears to be the strength of the Municipal Demarcation Act, is the recognition of 
the importance of service delivery in remote and impoverished areas of South Africa 
which have been long denied. In addition, the Act identifies the need for municipalities 
to be closer to their constituencies in order to allow citizens to actively engage with 
their service providers. According to Pycroft ‘the extension of municipal boundaries to 
                                                             
123 See Section 24 and 25 of the Municipal Demarcation Act. 
124 See Section 24 and 25 of the Municipal Demarcation Act. 
125 Mmola Bob (former mayor in Mogalakwena Municipality) and Kgosana S (Councillor of Vaaltyn), 
interviewed by Skosana, D at Vaaltyn, 12 August 2011. The reasons why the chiefs and their subjects 
refused incorporation are discussed later in this chapter. 
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combine small rural town and their adjacent rural areas is an acknowledgement of the 
economic and social linkages between rural and urban areas. By extending a council 
responsibility beyond the urban boundary, the demarcation process should, if the 
municipality performs its developmental role, facilitate a more equitable access to 
capital assets necessary for sustainability.126 
Potgietersrus/Mogalakwena municipality fell into the Category B municipalities. 
Mogalakwena was formed from the integration of three municipalities and their TLC’s 
namely: Greater Potgietersrus TLC, Greater Bakenberg TLC and the former Rebone 
Kolisrand TLC. Mogalakwena would share executive and legislative powers with the 
district municipality of Waterberg. The areas that would be incorporated were selected 
and divided on the basis of their proximity to town. The closer an area was to town the 
more there was a possibility of it being incorporated into Mogalakwena municipality. 
The implications of this were that certain areas under the authority of chief Alfred 
Kekana would fall within the authority of chief Langa and poorer villages would be 
represented together with affluent areas in the Mogalakwena municipality. This meant 
that the villages in which people used to pay tribal levies to the chief would have to pay 
water and electricity rates since they would be in possession of title deeds of the stands 
they were occupying. 
‘The undemocratic incorporation of Vaaltyn into Greater Potgietersrus’ 
The research identified two challenges with the incorporation process. These challenges 
are not only to be observed in the case of Vaaltyn but can also be traced to the various 
areas across South Africa in which chiefly rule remains legitimate. These challenges 
entailed the following: first, the lack of sufficient consultation by the Board with 
members of the chiefly family and, secondly, reducing tribal authority land that in turn 
threatened the legitimacy of chiefs. As in the case of Vaaltyn, in which there was a 
dispute, Joseph Kekana127 was able to sign away parts of the land previously under chief 
Alfred’s jurisdiction without his knowledge.   
                                                             
126 Pycroft, C. (1999). ‘Addressing  Rural Poverty: Restructuring Rural Local Government’, Democratising 
Local Government: The South African experiment. p. 114 
127 He was chief Kekana’s representative in the Transitional Local Council after Molalakgori retired 
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The areas classified under the farm Macalacaskop 243 KR are areas under chief Vaaltyn 
B. Some of these areas such as Mahwelereng are held in trust for Chief Kekana. 
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The former Greater Potgietersrus (now named Mokopane) was and continues to be the 
main city centre and the central business area in the Western District of the former 
Northern Province, now Limpopo. It contains the small and highly developed area of 
Potgietersrus128 central business district (CBD), industrial areas and a small affluent 
society residing mostly in the town centre and the suburb of  Alaska. Near the affluent 
and developed residential areas that were once reserved for the white inhabitants, lie 
areas with a large population of unemployed people who have low levels of disposable 
income and who are uninvolved in economic activity. These areas include Vaaltyn, 
Madiba, Sekgakgapeng, Masethlaneng, Masodi and Maruteng. Prior to the first 
democratic elections in 1994, these areas were connected to the former Greater 
Potgietersrus TLC as subject to traditional authorities as well as the government of the 
former Lebowa homeland and the former Transvaal Provincial Administration. 
Currently, the former Greater Potgietersrus Council constitutes the demarcated 
Mogalakwena Local Municipality. Mogalakwena is one of the five local municipalities in 
the recently formed Waterberg District129. It was established after the local elections in 
December 2000. Five traditional authorities are located within the Mogalakwena 
municipal area, namely Vaaltyn, Nkidikitlane, Bakoni Ba Matlala, Matlala, Bakenberg, 
Lekalakala, and Tauyatswala. 
In 1998 the then Northern Provincial administration stated in a final demarcation 
proposal130 that would be forwarded to the National Demarcation Board that they 
intended for the Potgietersrus131 municipality and its transitional local council to 
incorporate the villages nearest to town, one of which was the Vaaltyn Traditional 
                                                             
128 Named in honour of Piet Potgieter– leader of the Afrikaner white and renamed in 2001, Mokopane- the 
early chief of the Ndebebele of Kekana. Potgietersrus is also, often referred to, by locals as ‘Pprus’ or 
‘Potties’. 
129 The other municipalities within the Waterberg District Municipality are: Bela-Bela. Lephalala, 
Modimolle, Mookgopong and Thabazimbi, see Government Gazette No 21617, September 2000.  
 
130 The proposal was dated the 27th November 1998 pg. 349, Archival date: 18th January 99, pg. 243 
131 Also named Mahwelereng municipality. 
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Authority.132 Part of the Vaaltyn Traditional Authority farms which would be 
incorporated into the municipal area, were Turfspruit, Rietfontein, Lisbon, Tweefontein, 
a portion of Sandsloot and Knapdaar. The proposal also aimed for Greater Potgietersrus 
to fall within the Bushveld, now Waterberg133 District Council. The democratic 
government believed that incorporation would bring service delivery closer to the 
people of Vaaltyn and would make it simpler for them to participate in matters that 
affected their communities. Given the complexity of the land issue in South Africa, 
implementing the Municipal Demarcation Act was going to be a very complicated 
process. 
In 1998, when the local government of Mokopane requested legal opinion about service 
delivery in areas under the authority of the chief Kekana it was found that Mokopane 
Local Government for the areas of Vaaltyn, Sekgakgapeng and Madiba was not a local 
government body as defined in section 1 of the Local Government Transitional Act of 
1993. These areas were, according to the Government Notice no. 1885 of the 6th 
December 1963, situated in an area which had in terms of section 5 (1) no. 38 of the 
Black Administration Act of 1927 and the Bantu Authorities Act No. 68 of 1951, been 
defined as the area of the Ndebele Tribe under Acting Chief Alfred Bernard Kekana. This 
was also an area in which a Tribal Authority known as the Vaaltyn Tribal Authority was 
established in terms of the section 2 no. 68 of the Black Authorities Act of 1951. 
Administratively, the tribal authority had the powers to distribute and manage land 
affairs. The chief was responsible for delivering services to his own people.   
 
Even though the South African government had begun to revamp local governance and 
had promised accountability, efficiency, participation and service delivery post-1994, 
this did not persuade the Greater Potgietersrus local municipality to begin rendering 
services to Vaaltyn. When the Municipal Demarcation Act was enacted, the then 
Northern Province government’s condition was that Vaaltyn be incorporated into 
Greater Potgietersrus and only then, would they receive local municipal services.  
                                                             
132 Inclusive of all communal tribal land under guardian of chief Alfred. B Kekana. See map above. 
133 Also known as the Western District due of its geographical location. 
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An Urban Renewal Programme was one of the integrated presidential projects that 
intended to see that rural municipalities such as the Greater Potgietersrus, received 
basic services. In the municipality of Mogalakwena, an estimated R130 million was 
allocated to make certain the success of at least 24 projects that would ensure that  
water supply, pipeline and reservoirs, water reticulation, roads, electricity reticulation, 
community facilities and housing were in place by 1997.134 There were internal 
concerns raised by the Greater Potgietersrus municipality with regards to Vaaltyn. It 
was documented in the municipal minutes that: ‘The problem is related to the transfer 
of assets from Vaaltyn, Madiba, Sekgakgapeng and Mahwelereng, areas under the 
authority of chief Kekana’.135 The Greater Potgietersrus TLC had indicated that until the 
transfer of assets had occurred, they were legally not in a position to assume 
responsibilities with regard to the operation and maintenance of infrastructure in 
Vaaltyn, Mahwelereng, Madiba and Sekgkgapeng.’136This was irrespective of the fact 
that some infrastructure had already been built in Vaaltyn and other parts of chief 
Kekana’s land by the Greater Potgietersrus TLC.  It was clearly stated that the ‘TLC will 
not accept any responsibility for the infrastructure and networks that are located on 
private land’.137 With regard to water, the TLC decided that ‘they will sell bulk water to 
the owner of Vaaltyn, Madiba and Sekgakapeng (the chief), who will in turn maintain 
and operate the water networks on his land, provided a formal standard services 
agreement is entered into with the council.’138 Arguably, this was an indirect strategy to 
put pressure on the chief, in order for him to agree to be incorporated into Greater 
Potgietersrus and to transfer his assets to the Potgietersrus TLC. 
                                                             
134 Archival record of the 15th January 98 
135 Archival record of the 15th January 98 
136Ibid, pg 22. Part of being incorporated into Greater Potgietersrus entailed transferring privately owned 
assets, that comprise the basic infrastructure that enables Vaaltyn to provide basic services for itself. i.e. 
pipeline system, electric cables, station, road construction and maintenance machines etc. 
137 Why would the TLC build infrastructure on the chief’s private land if later on, they would refuse to 
operate and maintain it? Arguably some of the networks in the whole area of Potgietersrus would not 
function efficiently without being partly connected to Vaaltyn and surrounding areas. In addition, the 
infrastructure was also built in Vaaltyn because the TLC knew that eventually Vaaltyn would be 
incorporated. And what they dreaded was a case in which they built infrastructure that did not go passed 
Vaaltyn and would later on, be forced to budget once more to build networks that they did not construct 
ab initio.      
138 Archival records dated 15 January 1998 
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Contrary to the argument presented above, Mr William Madonsela from the office of the 
MEC for Land, Housing and Local Government gave assurance to members of the chiefly 
family in a meeting on 29 March 1995139 in which the TLC of Greater Potgietersrus and 
a local branch SANCO was present. This occurred during the early talks about the 
demarcation process and the chief was concerned about his area. Madonsela said to the 
TLC: ‘Hands off the kgosi’s land; such land will definitely not be transferred to the 
Transitional Local Council.’ 140 One of the critical views that emerged from this meeting 
was the consensus view that Malesela Joseph Kekana should be removed as chief 
Kekana’s representative.141 Malesela Joseph Kekana was appointed by Molalakgori who 
retired from his position in the TLC. During the entire process of incorporation and 
contestation the royal family was mired in the succession dispute which was discussed 
in chapter 2.142 One pole of this dispute was Molalakgori, who had assumed the position 
of Chief Alfred Kekana, the incumbent and had effectively displaced Alfred’s authority, 
including his place on the TLC.  When asked about what Joseph Kekana’s position was in 
matters of chieftainship, the response was that: 
Malesela Joseph Kekana also had a relationship with the TLC. He was receiving a 
salary package from them and as a result, concurred with the government. 
Malesela Joseph Kekana took powers from Madimetsa John Kekana [Molalakgori, 
father of the current chief] who is the reason why the current chief mounted to 
power. Molalakgori was a senior councillor and he was old, therefore he was 
instructed to appoint someone else and he appointed Malesela Joseph Kekana.143 
The royal family indicated how unhappy they were to have Mr Malesela Joseph Kekana 
as the chief’s representative. Even so, this did not stop him from declaring himself as the 
candidate who was authorised by the chief and his tribal council to represent them and 
to sign all necessary documentation.144 In a letter addressed to the TLC of Greater 
Potgietersrus on the 8th of July 1997, Malesela Joseph Kekana had written that:  
                                                             
139 Archival records dated the 29th March 1995 
140 Archival dated the 29th March 1995 
141 This view was disputed in the interviews I conducted with the tribal council in August 2009. 
142 This dispute is discussed in detail in the next chapter 
143 Interview: Mocks Mokhonoana 
144Archival records dated 10 April 2000  
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The chief, bakgomana [tribal council] together with the representative M. J 
Kekana fully supports the incorporation of the areas namely Vaaltyn, Madiba, and 
Sekgakgapeng into Greater Potgietersrus Transitional Local Council145  
Subsequent to this, there were meetings amongst the Greater Potgietersrus TLC to 
discuss delivering services to Vaaltyn and other areas belonging to the chief. Even so, 
the royal family was very vocal about their grievances. During the early talks about 
incorporation, the royal family had written on behalf of chief Alfred, to the TLC that: 
Kgosi Alfred Kekana wants to put it on record that he supports the Local 
Government Transitional Act of 1993. He therefore does not have any problem 
whatsoever with the creation of democratically constituted local government 
including his areas. His attitude towards the TLC of Greater Potgietersrus is that 
its negotiation forum as contemplated by the Act was not as inclusive as it 
possibly can. He [the chief] was neither invited nor consulted when the same was 
instituted146 
The letter went further to indicate that Malesela Joseph Kekana ‘who purports to be the 
chief’s representative’ was not appointed by him. Therefore ‘any agreement which 
involves him is not binding on chief Kekana and that in fact, chief Kekana feels 
undermined by the council’s actions of not discussing with him the inclusion of his area 
to the council’. 147 The chief then requested a meeting with the Council to resolve this 
problem. 
 This was not the only attempt by the chief to articulate his concerns. After 
incorporation, a memorandum was submitted by Mocks Mokhonoane on behalf of Chief 
Alfred to the premier of the Northern Province and to the Greater Potgietersrus 
Municipality to reiterate that Vaaltyn was incorporated without the knowledge of the 
chief and the people. The letter described the incorporation as ‘undemocratic’ and 
undermining of the chief. The ‘undemocratic’ incorporation of Vaaltyn into Greater 
Potgietersrus supports Ralph Mathekga’s observation that ‘the implementation of the 
institutional apparatus of the new local government has had problems in terms of 
                                                             
145 Archival records dated 10 April 2000 signed by Malesela Joseph Kekana. 
146 Archival records dated 10 April 2000 
147 Ibid 
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securing citizens’ participation’.148 One of the major problems he emphasizes, is the 
structure of the local government in South Africa, which he terms a ‘technocratic system 
of local governance’. He also criticizes the local government’s tendency to stress and 
portray itself as an agency for services and for placing less emphasis on its role as an 
agent of participation.149  
The memorandum also pointed out its concern about incorporating ‘third world 
communities’ with ‘first world communities’. This was said to be problematic as poorer 
communities were expected to pay the same rates for services.150 As Rasin warns, 
justice issues are in question and that ‘unless there are distributive transfers, urban-
rural inequalities are accentuated’.151 The memorandum written by Mr Mocks proposed 
an independent rural local government for Vaaltyn that would report directly to the 
provincial government as provided in Chapter 12 of the new Constitution. The new local 
government would include Mahwelereng, Sekgakgapeng, Madiba, Masehlaneng and the 
western end of the frontier. The advantages of this according to memorandum were 
that: ‘the authority of the chief will be ensured; stability in this communities will be 
maintained; civic structures will be accommodated in the new authority and direct 
budget will be provided to the local government to develop this previously 
disadvantaged communities’.152  The memorandum further warned the TLC that, should 
Vaaltyn not be withdrawn from Greater Potgietersrus, the TLC would lose its popularity 
as it had in Mahwelereng and that the ultimate result would be confrontation.153 
Mahwelereng – a township adjacent to Vaaltyn - was also incorporated into Greater 
Potgietersrus. Subsequently, the TLC enforced the system of rates in which users had to 
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pay for services such as water and electricity. More affluent residents could afford the 
rates, while the people from Mahwelereng could not. To ensure that they paid their 
share, the TLC embarked on a system of issuing summonses and thereafter invading the 
property of those who could not pay.154 Edgar Pieterse offers an explanation that ‘the 
basic assumption of this reform was that larger municipalities would be able to combine 
viable areas (in terms of revenue base) with unviable areas and in position to service 
more people effectively’.155 The objective was ‘to achieve a degree of redistribution 
between relatively rich urban areas and the poor rural areas’156 
Brij Maharaj who asseses the boundary determination process in the Durban 
Metropolitan area, points to similar but different cases in their reasons for refusal to be 
incorporated. He shows how affluent areas such as the Borough of Westville and  
Tongaat Hullet ‘attempted to isolate themselves from the larger socio-spatial fabric, and 
demonstrated reluctance to share and distribute resources’.157 When Westville was 
labelled as racist for intending to have a separate municipality, the mayor Nicky 
Armstrong stated: 
We are not trying to maintain a small white enclave. We want a council that will 
reflect the rich, multi-cultural dimension of our area, while retaining Westville’s 
name as well as the special ambiance we have here.158 
Maharaj also illustrates the circumspect manner in which the MEC for Local 
Government in Kwazulu Natal dealt with the anxiety of traditional leaders who were 
concerned about losing their legitimacy during the boundary determination process. 
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The MEC had ‘submitted a proposal to the Board in which tribal land was 159excluded 
from the process’. The Board could not agree on this matter and referred it to the 
Special Electoral Court for a resolution. In November 1995, ‘the court supported the 
MEC’s proposal. The Court however, stipulated that the MEC continue to negotiate with 
areas adjacent to the metro to be included if all parties were in agreement’160. 
Subsequently, the tribal areas of Ingqungqulu and Kwamgaga areas agreed to be 
incorporated. But tribal areas within the Durban Northern alignment, expressed their 
fear of losing their powers. Even so, they understood the need for people to access 
services and thus agreed to be incorporated provided the chiefs’ historical authority 
remained recognised. Maharaj’s case study makes it seem as if there were ways in 
which the parties concerned about the process could come forward and present their 
cases to the government - which would then reach a compromise that would suit all 
parties involved. However Vaaltyn illustrates a completely different outcome in which 
no compromise was reached. A major reason why this did not happen, in contrast  to 
KwaZulu-Natal, was the succession dispute in Vaaltyn.  
In a meeting with the land commission, on behalf of the tribal council in contention for 
chieftainship, Abram Kekana who is a senior tribal councillor said in anger, ‘Is it 
acceptable to have someone hijack your car to then decorate it?’161 This expressed how 
the tribal council felt about the process of being incorporated into Greater 
Potgietersrus, with the democratic government assuring the royal family that it would 
be for their own benefit.  Abram also questioned the government officials, ‘We have 
come to your office, all 12 of us. Is it then possible to have one person sign the land 
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away?’ The response was that, ‘the Provincial government are the ones who allowed M.J. 
Kekana to sign therefore they are the rightful people to discuss the issue with’. Abram 
Kekana also brought to the attention of the government officials during the meeting, a 
concern about Mpho Mogale’s162 view that he supported the incorporation of Vaaltyn 
because ‘sifuna ukubulala ubundebelenyana lobu benu’ (we intend to destroy your 
inferior Ndebele identity).  
Beall, Mkhize and Vawda illustrate in their case study of democracy and tradition, 
chieftaincy and transition in KwaZulu-Natal, similar outcomes in which at least 15 
chieftaincies had to be incorporated into the Ethekwini Metropolitan Municipality. The 
authors reveal that the demarcation process worsened the tension between the African 
National Congress municipal councillors and the Inkatha Freedom Party leaders who 
were part of the chiefdoms that had to be incorporated. The authors’ explain that the 
chief’s reluctance to be incorporated was a consequence of fears of the possibility of 
sharing or losing power to the municipal councillors. The demarcation process would 
curtail tribal land.  Moreover, the chiefs were concerned that there was not enough 
consultation prior to the enactment of the demarcation process.  The Chief in Vaaltyn 
had very similar concerns. The negotiations and memoranda shed important light on 
the complications of the demarcations process. It was not just the affluent areas that 
were concerned about having to pay high rates to compensate poor communities which 
would be incorporated into their area. Chiefs were equally concerned, because 
incorporation threatened their legitimacy and identity. In the case of Vaaltyn 
demarcation meant that some parts of the villages would not fall within the boundary of 
Mogalakwena municipality and that certainly threatened the chiefs’ authority.  
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the demarcation process in Vaaltyn and the challenge it posed in 
the context of the dispute over the legitimacy of the chieftainship. In this case the tribal 
land belonging to the Ndebele was signed away by Malesela Joseph Kekana who was 
controversially appointed to be Chief Alfred Kekana’s representative in the TLC. The 
archival minutes show that indeed Chief Alfred and a faction of his tribal council refused 
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incorporation.  One can also conclude that Malesela Joseph Kekana signed the land away 
because he had patronage relations with Molalakgori which extended to the local and 
provincial government. The way in which networks of patronage play themselves out 
will be further explored in the next chapter on mining in Vaaltyn and surrounding areas. 
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Chapter 4 
The encounter between the Kekana chiefly family, communities and the Platinum 
Reef Resource mining interest narratives: A local and provincial government 
initiation 
 
On a rainy day on the 18th January 2012 two strikes took place. One strike was 
organised by communities in Magogwa, Vaaltyn, Mosesetjane, all under the authority of 
Chief Vaaltyn B. A counter strike was taking place at the same time.  As they were 
marching they sang ‘Re ka selese di mine di tseela mashemo re legona, joina mozabalazo, 
Akse Joina, e joina e joina joina.. .’ (‘we will not let the mines take our farms while we are 
alive. Join the strike.’)   
Terrance Kekana, who belong to the Kekana lineage and is a member of SANCO revealed 
that: ‘the counter-strike comprises of people who have been organised by the Nduna. 
They have come with violent gadgets you see - pangas and knob kirries. However, 
because of the presence of the police they cannot not use their weapons.’  Terrence’s 
view was that the headmen and chief Vaaltyn B were responsible for separating the 
community. He explained further that: ‘We are trying to understand how the mines got 
to our areas because these mines did not consult the people.’163 
The mining industry is one of the only vigorously flourishing economic sectors in 
Mokopane. The Platinum Reef Resources Mine (PRRM) had engaged in prospecting 
negotiations about mining in Mokopane with the South African government since 
1988.164 The negotiations had been successful to varying degrees. Like other 
stakeholders, PRRM had been affected by the constant amendment of the mineral rights 
legislation in South Africa. Apart from this challenge, the mine also had to negotiate with 
the Kekana family that was, as we have seen, mired in a succession dispute.165 This 
chapter explores the interaction between the Platinum Reef Resource Mine, the 
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Mokopane local government and the Kekana chiefdom. It is a story of manipulation by 
the mining company of the provincial government and the local chief Vaaltyn B – to get 
them to buy into the prospecting and mining activity by material persuasion. In this 
way, the idea that chiefs are custodians of the interests of their communities is undone, 
as is the accountability of the chief to the people. In buying the chief and the provincial 
government off, the real interests of the community were undermined. 
 
 
The Mineral rights Act in South Africa 
Historically, the South African mineral rights law has been subject to various 
amendments, leading to uncertainties amongst stakeholders and communities about 
current and future of ownership rights. Cawood and Minnitt point out that ‘each new 
legislative strand was laid down in response to the needs of either government or 
industry’ and that this ‘has lead to a complex of legislative web being woven around 
mineral rights ownership’.166 In the seventeenth century, in terms of the Roman Dutch 
legal system pertaining at the time, the owner of land had the right of possession of 
what was beneath the land extending to the space above the sky.167  Although this legal 
system still exists in South Africa, law that came in with the British colonial period 
superseded the earlier Dutch system.  The proclamation of 1813 and later the 1912 
Land Settlement Act under the Union government, mineral rights were vested in the 
state which would then lease these rights to whoever it pleased.168 Years later, the 
mineral rights law was once more overturned to favour private owners. Subsequently, 
the Reserved Mineral Development Act of 1925 gave owners of alienated state land or 
their nominee’s exclusive rights to prospect or to mine on their land. The state however 
declared the rights to royalty payments if the mine was established in this type of land. 
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The mineral rights legislation was modified again in 1942 to allow the state to intervene 
should the owners of land not exercise their exclusive rights to prospect for and mine 
base. Cawood and Minnitt state that with the formation of the Republic of South Africa, 
mineral rights ownership developed in a such a way that various minerals were 
regulated by separate statutes which added to the complexity of the system. The 
Mineral Act 50 of 1990 was a continuation of the existing private ownership of minerals. 
Even so, landowners on alienated state land or their nominees lost their exclusive right 
to prospect in favour of the state. For Cawood and Minnitt, this entailed the 
continuation of the past practice in which mining houses secured prospecting rights. On 
the other hand the state lost its control over proclaimed mining areas in favour of the 
surface owner.169 The aim was to reduce government involvement and to create a 
market for state owned mineral rights. The ANC opposed the direction that the mineral 
rights legislation was taking in South Africa.’170 Subsequently, the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002 (the ‘New Act’) provides a dispensation 
which entirely replaced the one that was created by the 1991 Minerals Act  and vested 
the state, as opposed to private property owners, with custodianship of South Africa's 
resources. Steve Lenahan argues that ‘the interpretation of the Freedom Charter as 
signifying nationalisation of the mines was abandoned and replaced with the notion of 
state custodianship of mineral rights which would be leased to private sector 
applicants.’171  
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Mining in Mokopane 
According to the Chamber of Mines of South Africa, ‘in 2010, the mining sector 
accounted for 8.6% which amounts to R100.6 - billion of GDP.172 Jones makes the point 
that South Africa has more than 80% of the worlds platinum reserves, and is the largest 
producer of platinum group metals. He notes that Impala and Amplats Platinum are two 
largest producers of platinum in the world. Limpopo Province contains the largest 
concentration of platinum reserves. The current exploitable South African reserves of 
the platinum group metals are concentrated in Merensky Reef, Plat Reef and UG2 
Cromitite layer. The platinum reef is mined only at Potgietersrus Platinum (Amplat)’173 
Wilson shows that ‘Limpopo Province's primary minerals income made up 10.3% of 
South Africa’s total primary mineral sales in 2001 and that within Limpopo, the mining 
sector paid in excess of R 2.5 bn in remuneration in 2001.’174  
Mogalakwena Municipality falls into the Bushveld Mineral Complex175 which is said to 
contain one of the richest ore deposits on earth.176 ‘The reserves of chromium, platinum, 
palladium, osmium, iridium, rhodium and ruthenium are the world’s largest. The 
Bushveld Mineral Complex is over ‘‘67000km2 in extent, an area the size of Ireland. It 
extends from Rustenburg in the west through Mokopane, in the North Lydennburg and 
in the East.’177 
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The Department of Land Affairs enjoined the Platinum Reef Resource mine to enter into 
prospecting negotiations with the Kekana. At this time Chief Alfred Kekana was still 
alive. A meeting took place between the royal family and the Platinum Reef mine on the 
on the 8th February 2000. The Chief Director of Platinum Reef Resources, Hyden then 
noted that it had been 12 years since their mine began to explore in the area of 
Mokopane. He stated that since then they had obtained certified exploration rights from 
the South African government on the 19th January 2000.178 However, he explained that 
because of the difference of opinion between the Platinum Reef Resources Mine and 
some members of the government, they were coerced into making arrangements to 
meet with the Kekana family.179 
The Director of Platinum Reef Resources in South Africa, Van Schalkwyk, said when he 
had to address the tribal council that:  
It is not our first time in the area of Mokopane as Hyden has already explained. 
We are here to come to some form of agreement with you because we would 
like to avoid a situation in which you see an aeroplane examining what’s 
beneath the earth without your knowledge. We intend to continue with the 
prospection and should we come across what we are looking for, then you will 
receive royalties.180 
At the time of this meeting, chief Alfred was still alive. Therefore the Platinum Reef mine 
could establish the rightful persons in the chiefly family to consult. It transpired in an 
interview with a retired employee who held a developmental post in a chrome mine, 
that one of the challenges that the mines encountered as they negotiated to explore in 
South Africa, was not being informed about who the rightful person to approach was. He 
further noted that immediately when a mine decides to prospect they approach the 
owner of a particular piece of land through the land registrar that is kept by the 
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government.  He then highlighted the predicament that the people who appear on the 
registry as owners of a particular piece of land are in most cases not the ones occupying 
it. This creates tension between the owners of that land, the people who occupy it, the 
government and the mine that intends to explore it.181  
Subsequently, a meeting took place on the 17 February 2000, in which the Kekana were 
advised to elect three trustees from the tribal council and to form a Development Trust 
named after the area of Vaaltyn. Abram Kekana, Mocks Mokhonwana, chief Alfred 
Kekana and his son Vaaltyn A Kekana were elected as trustees in the Platinum Reef 
Resources Trustee Committee.182Africon and the Plat Reef Resources 183 promised in 
this meeting that mining in Mokopane would open up employment opportunities.184 
The mine also assured the Kekana that they would help out with the installation of 
water pipes that would not only be used in the mine but by the community of Vaaltyn as 
well. The mine would also help reconstruct the old tribal office. The meeting was 
concluded with assurance from the Plat Reef Resource mine that they would get back to 
negotiate royalties.  
Chief Alfred died on the 7 April 2000. Subsequent to his death, the succession dispute 
intensified and interrupted the prospecting negotiations.185 When the government gave 
recognition to Vaaltyn B in 2001, the Platinum Reef Resource Mine began to negotiate 
only with the new recognised chief’s tribal council. This sidelined Vaaltyn A and his 
tribal council. Moreover the decisions taken between the local, provincial government, 
Vaaltyn B and the Platinum Reef Mine affected communities within the authority of 
chief Vaaltyn B more negatively than positively. One of the positive outcomes about the 
Platinum Reef mine exploration in Vaaltyn has been the installation of water pipes and 
the building of some roads for the plant which was of benefit to the villagers. However it 
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became apparent during the interviews that the residents of Vaaltyn and surrounding 
areas were aggrieved about the patronage networks between Plat Reef, its affiliate 
mines, the local and provincial government and the chief. 
 
The narratives about the struggle against the Platinum Reef Resource Mine in 
Vaaltyn and surrounding areas.  
 
Mr Molwatse who is chairperson of SANCO at a branch level recounted:  
It all started in 2001 when they came to Magongwa186 okay! Then, the village 
was not informed about this company coming here and we had no knowledge 
about who did they negotiate with. We just saw things happening, machines 
digging outside our yards and in our fields. This is when we started to stand up 
to question what was happening, you see. Eh, when we enquired with the 
headman we didn’t get answers and he threatened to get us killed’187   
Apart from the headman’s threats to kill them and police efforts to discourage people 
from mobilising, the Platinum Reef deployed a strategy in which they would 
temporarily employ the people who seemed to pose a threat. Molwatse recalls that:  
When we would gather to share information, they would approach us and offer 
us some piece job of about two weeks you see. The headman’s children are also 
used to hire people. This made it difficult for us to investigate the issue of mines. 
Thus we decided to approach the royal house in Moshate (Vaaltyn). We 
reported this matter and they said that they will call the headman to come and 
meet with us.188 
The payment of certain amounts to people, interruption of meetings and threatening 
behaviour seems common practice among mining houses. Andrew Mason and Bernard 
Mbenga drew attention to the royal Bafokeng case in which Gencor and Impala 
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Platinum strategically, aligned itself with the Bophuthatswana government in order to 
attain mining rights in the deeps. The two authors show that Gencor paid the salaries of 
government officials, Leslie Young, who was the Bophuthatswana Minister of Finance at 
the time, being one of them.189 The lengths to which mining houses would take to secure 
mining rights can also be deduced when Jeff Kekana (Vaaltyn B’s tribal councillor) 
spoke about the inauguration of Chief Vaaltyn B. Jeff Kekana explained that the animal 
skin that the chief wore on the day of the inauguration was bought by the Canadians. In 
an attempt to explain why they had bought the inauguration skin, he remarked that:   
These people mine here in our area. We have the surface rights, they have 
mineral rights. So we negotiate, time and again when they want to extend the 
mine...Anything that we demand they would say, because it is the royal chief, let 
us get them whatever they demand. They would be trying to hypnotise us to give 
them the farm, you see. We are constantly with them, we sit with them in 
meetings, we are constantly negotiating, negotiating the farms. So at the time we 
were inaugurating the chief, we told the people from the mines, plus it is very 
expensive. They said ‘no! We will inform one of our people and they got it.190 
 
In order for one to get a clearer sense of how the mining company suddenly found itself 
in a position where they had to buy a tiger’s skin, one had to ask the question, who do 
mining companies speak to when they desire to set up a mine in Mokopane? Joseph 
Kekana stated that: 
Initially they were supposed to come to us first. We who own the surface 
rights, but they go to the government which owns the mineral rights. They 
submit applications to the Department of Minerals and Resources. When they 
get there, they get directed to us.  They are instructed to come and consult with 
us before their application can be accepted by the government. The 
government tells them that the land belongs to the chief, they [the government] 
owns what is underneath our land. So then they come to us. When they get to 
us, they have to pay madume (tribute’. They have to pay a certain amount 
before we speak to them because they are from the business side of things. The 
tribute is like the one you would pay to the traditional healers, only that ours is 
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higher. It is about R30. 000 to R50. 000, depending on the mining company. 
They could be speaking informally with our council, then we say to our 
councillors that if it is those tell them to prepare in this manner and that 
manner.191 
 
This perhaps explains why the local and provincial government opted to give formal 
recognition to Vaaltyn B instead of Vaaltyn A. I have suggested elsewhere that the local 
government may have given recognition to Vaaltyn B because his father had relations 
with the government dating as far back as the apartheid era. Secondly, that recognition 
of the right to chieftainship during the government investigations of the Kekana 
succession dispute may have been biased because of the already existing relationship. 
In Chapter 2, I suggested in addition, that the local and provincial government gave 
recognition to Vaaltyn B because of his personality, background and his tribal council 
who guaranteed a relatively less complicated working relationship compared to Vaaltyn 
A and his tribal council.  
A mining company wants to develop a mine in Vaaltyn on a piece of land that belongs to 
the chief. The one chief is an advocate for the preservation of heritage and a sacred sites, 
on the other hand is a chief who is open to change so long as he can benefit monetarily.  
This is not to say that the more traditional chief would not consider financial benefits. 
However, I suggest that there is a greater possibility that the traditional chief and his 
tribal council might either refuse to give up that piece of land or may take a lengthy 
period of time to consider the proposal as compared to the chief who has a more 
contemporary set of aspirations. As a result it might be that the provincial government 
and local government gave authority to the chief who would be less difficult to work 
with. Broadly this resembles the colonial and apartheid pattern in which the Governor 
General could appoint a person as a chief or a headman in charge of a tribe or 
location.192 Often these were ‘persons’ who would be appointed on the basis of their 
willingness to cooperate with the colonial or apartheid state.   
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SANCO and community members claim that for years, they have written memoranda to 
the chief and both the provincial and local government and have had no response. Mr 
Molwatse, a leading member of SANCO, states that he finally managed to meet with chief 
Vaaltyn B whose excuse was that he had not been able to get hold of his headman. 
Molwatse was disbelieving and said:  
When went back to them again to ask why they had not called a meeting, 
their response was that when they write letters to the headman he does not 
attend the meetings and that surprised us because they are the authorities. 
The headman should obey the chief, and when the chief summons the 
headman he must respond.193 
He went further to explain that chief Vaaltyn B and his headman have never had good 
relations with the residents of Mokopane. He maintained that: 
We formed SANCO to fight for the rights of civilians. The police begun to 
intervene in our gatherings, I think because they received financial support from 
the mining company. They threatened people not to attend meetings outside the 
tribal court.  They knew that if we held meetings at the tribal court we wouldn’t 
be free to voice our concerns. We concluded that we would continue to have our 
meetings outside the tribal court and we tried to get as much information as we 
could so that people would know what was happening.194 
Molwatse recounts that after a while he and other SANCO members were referred to the 
tribal office which was said to be in a position to respond to any queries that they had 
about the mines. In the 2003, due to their lack of faith in the tribal office they had 
decided to seek help in the municipal offices. They encountered the mayor Bob Mmola 
who denied any knowledge to the existence of the Platinum Reef Resource Reef mine in 
the area of Mokopane. He then promised the SANCO members who were in his office 
that he would investigate the matter. 
Molwatse recalls that: 
It was on Friday when Mmola promised that by Wednesday, the following 
week, he would have met the mining company and conducted some 
investigations. He said “When you come to me on Thursday I will give you a 
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report”. A week went by and the second week went by. When we went to his 
office they told us he is not present. Okay! Right, we left a note that he 
should at least call us to inform us what was happening about mines. We 
waited for his response and there was none and we went there once again. 
We were told that he is attending a meeting in Bakenberg. We said, this is 
going to be another waste of time. We didn’t leave immediately after his 
secretary told us that he is not there. Bob Mmola thought that we left 
immediately [laughs].  He appeared on the very door when we had been told 
that he is not there [laughter] and he found us waiting for him. He was 
ashamed to see me and Magoro.195   
In response to the sarcastic question from Molwatse about which door Molla used to 
enter the building since there was only one entrance, Molla confessed that he had been 
avoiding the SANCO delegates as he had not yet done the promised investigations. He 
assured them however that once he had conducted these investigations he would 
compile a report that he would send to them. Molwatse remarked that they never 
received this report. When they approached the mine management, Molwatse reveals 
that: 
The managers were black people, the black capitalists. We found a man 
named Kwetse the manager, and the other one with the surname of 
Ramashala and Kekana the one who is still there presently. Eric the director 
was not there. Eh - they wouldn’t give us an appointment or a specific date. 
They just said come back next week our big boss is going to be here.196  
Molwatse continued:  
We were fortunate one of the days we found Eric there, we were there with 
the people whose fields had been invaded. Eric then started to understand 
that there is a problem. He then instructed his managers to go to the 
headmen and meet with the people and discuss what was happening. We 
told him that we do not agree to go and meet at someone’s house, we would 
like to meet at a neutral venue so that we can air our concerns and they 
should air theirs we should be free to talk. Because at that man’s house it is a 
capital of abusive language, people won’t be free to talk there, then we 
thought that will be sorted but the neutral venue was not arranged. And we 
found out that Kwetse is the cousin of the headman, they are related you see, 
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he protected his cousin so that he should continue benefitting from this 
whole thing.  
Molwatse explained that they then decided to approach the provincial government, 
which failed to respond to their queries. He claims that they kept writing to the 
provincial government. Finally, the provincial government intervened and wrote a letter 
to the headman to summon him to a meeting on 15th September 2010. On that day they 
went to the provincial government in Pietersburg and waited in vain for the headman.  
Molwatse recalls that:  
The Provincial government was able to establish where the mining company 
office was and that the mine manager is Sello Kekana.  They said they were 
going to do their investigations and they said that those people do not a have 
mining licence and the permission to mine here. We never heard from them 
again.197 
SANCO then decided to approach the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) who 
referred them to chief Vaaltyn Kekana B. Chief Kekana B was then called by the DMR 
and they agreed to meet with SANCO and community members. It was suggested that a 
task team be formed which would represent all the affected areas. On the day upon 
which the meeting was intended to convene, neither chief Kekana, his headman, 
representatives of DMR nor the provincial government showed up. Subsequently, the 
SANCO members organised another meeting on 17th October 2010 and again only 
SANCO members were present at.  SANCO decided to try once again to get in touch with 
the DMR . 
Molwatse recounted the course of events:   
On the 15th of November the [Department of ] Mineral Resources 
surprisingly pitched.  They investigated the extent of the damage and 
discovered that it was severe in Magongwa. DMR sent letters to the 
headman to inform him that mining in Magongwa was wrong and illegal and 
that the mining should be suspended with immediate effect.198  
Molwatse described the conundrum that people faced: 
                                                             
197
 ibid 
198 ibid 
79 
 
We decided to get legal representation since the mine continued to do so 
without proper documentation. They mine at night when people are asleep. 
The machines come out and at night they take them back. They offer people 
small sums of money which are very little to what they dig beneath. It’s like 
when you have chickens in your yard selling them, and someone comes and 
gives you R10 and say give me that chicken. The price that you selling could 
be is R45 you see, but now people determine a price for you. You are forced 
to take that amount that you are being offered because if you don’t take it 
they will take it back. We want the mine to pay a standard fee to the 
community.199 
Andrew Manson and Bernard Mbenga quote James Sutherland who was a lawyer to the 
Bafokeng who said that ‘the playing fields are skewed’.200 He meant by this that the 
relationship between mining companies and land owners is unequal. The government 
adds some level of complexity to this unequal relationship. In the case of Vaaltyn the 
local government of Mokopane is an ally of the Platinum Reef Resource Mine. This 
makes it difficult for people to raise their concerns with the local and provincial 
government. The relationship between the mines and the local government was 
highlighted by the Mayor of Mogalakwena municipality, Bob Mmola, when he recounted 
his success as the mayor of Mogalakwena in the 10 years that he had been in office. He 
spoke openly about being the first to developm the area of Mokopane through 
collaboration with the Anglo Platinum and other mining companies.201 He stated that, 
‘since working in the municipality with the Anglo Platinum, we have reached a 
partnership of R91 million projects which include the development of pipeline, 
electricity and roads. Some of these projects are complete whereas some of them are 
not’.202 Even though he was not referring to the Platinum Reef Resource mine, Mmola 
shed light on the long-standing relationship that he had with Anglo Platinum and he had 
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mentioned that he knew some of the mine managers personally. It was obvious that he 
valued the role played by the Anglo Platinum Reef mine and other mining companies in 
the area. He also drew attention to the fact that he had natured his ties with the mining 
companies in the same way that he had done with traditional leaders and that it was 
through constant interaction and negotiation.  
The problem with Platinum Reef Resource not only affected the community of Vaaltyn 
and Magongwa. Surrounding areas such as Mosesetjane and Kgobudi all of which fell 
under chief Vaaltyn B were affected as well. On 30 August 2011 it was reported that ‘the 
community of Mosesetjane has successfully demanded the stoppage of 27 prospecting 
rigs owned by Plat Reef Resources. The action is being taken in conjunction with Jubilee 
Mokopane, using several different pickets of 15 people at each prospecting rig.’203 
Mosesetjane community and Jubilee Mokopane made the following demand to the Plat 
Reef Resources:  
Plat Reef Resources and any subcontractors must immediately stop 
prospecting, the rigs be taken off the community's land, if Plat Reef or any 
other company or entity wants to prospect on their land, they must go 
through the proper channels to get the consent of the entire community, not 
just the traditional leader without the community's consent.204 
In other areas the Jubilee South Africa205 released a statement that ‘The communities of 
Malokong and Rooiwal, near Mokopane in Limpopo province, will be marching 
tomorrow, Tuesday 12 January, in protest at the Royal Granite company mining in hills 
adjacent to their villages which include ancestral graves.’206 
Jubilee South Africa added that:  
Platreef Resources is prospecting for platinum on the Kgobudi community 
land, a few kilometers from the notorious Anglo Platinum mine, on the basis 
of a deal with a self-imposed headman, Malose Kekana, and his section 21 
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company. Malose Kekana’s brother is the recognised headman, but Malose 
Kekana has assumed the role of headman without due process. There has 
been no inauguration or address to the community to this effect. Malose 
Kekana and his allies are dragging community members through a 
protracted court process on spurious charges of theft and intimidation. The 
allegation of intimidation has also been used as an excuse for failing to 
convene the tribal council to discuss the matter of prospecting. 207 
 
 
Conclusion 
Three consistent issues can be drawn from these narratives. First, the people were 
concerned about activities that took place in their area without their knowledge. 
Secondly, they were convinced that these activities, if entered into openly, could be of 
benefit in their communities. Lastly the patronage network between the current 
recognised chief Vaaltyn B, the mines and the local and provincial government created a 
sense of helplessness among the people. They feared that, there was no one who was 
accountable or to whom they felt they could voice their concerns. For this reason, 
people in the community decided to join the local SANCO branch. In turn these concerns 
influenced people’s perceptions about the legitimacy of the current chief and in general, 
the institution of chieftainship.208 
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Chapter 5 
People’s perceptions about the succession dispute and the continuing existence of 
chieftainship 
 
This chapter focuses on people’s perceptions about the succession dispute between the 
two contenders of the Kekana chieftainship and the effects it had on community 
members. It shows how villagers perceive the relationship between chief Vaaltyn B and 
the local government of Mokopane. It probes whether the people do in fact support 
chief Vaaltyn B or whether his authority only stems from his recognition by the local 
and provincial government. Furthermore, the chapter investigates whether the villagers 
under the authority of chief Vaaltyn B support the persistence of the institution of 
chieftainship.  
In the second chapter, the background to the contenders for the chieftainship was 
considered. It illustrated how the background of Vaaltyn B, the place where he grew up, 
the nature of his relationship to the  tribal council, his social setting and his personality 
worked in favour of his being recognised by the local and provincial government as 
opposed to his rival Vaaltyn A. It demonstrated various determinants for the 
legitimisation of a chief from above. However, this does not necessarily mean that since 
chieftainship in the case of Vaaltyn is legitimized by the local and provincial 
government, that the recognised chief always becomes ‘a dummy of the state’.209 
Instead, it sees the legitimisation of Vaaltyn B, as a depiction of a collaborative 
relationship which could be of benefit for both traditional leadership and local 
governance. The third and fourth chapters show how the dispute provided a platform to 
exclude members of the faction whose views collided with Vaaltyn B and his tribal 
council. Vaaltyn A and his tribal council seek to preserve the Northern Ndebele 
language, aspects of traditional identity, culture and land practices. The need to 
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preserve these features collides with the modern economic aspirations of Vaaltyn B and 
his tribal council.  
The data for this chapter was gathered from group interviews,210 after I was informed 
about a forthcoming community meeting in the area of Magongwa which was called211 
in order to mobilize for a march against the Platinum Reef Mine, the Nduna (the 
headman) and chief Vaaltyn B. Although, Magongwa is not in the exact same area as the 
case study for this thesis, it is relevant as it is one of the villages under the authority of 
chief Vaaltyn B. Each village is allocated a headman who in turn appoints his own tribal 
council.212 SANCO members pointed out that their vision was to organize briefing 
meetings in all eighteen villages under the authority of chief Vaaltyn B. However, due to 
the proximity of the submission date for the memorandum that would be given to the 
Platinum Reef mine, the final meeting took place on the actual day of the march. The 
villagers who were present were from Vaaltyn, Mosesetjane, Magongwa, Mozumba, 
Tshamahantshe, and Mahwelereng.213  
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People’s perceptions about the dispute and its effects on their areas 
The villagers who had been interviewed were informed214 about the succession dispute 
between the incumbent chief Vaaltyn B and his rival, Vaaltyn A. However, not everyone 
understood the contours of the succession dispute. One old man attempted to give 
details about the dispute in the following way:   
Chief L V Kekana is from the family of the uncle to the late chief Alfred. Thus 
there have been efforts taken to ensure that he steps down from power. We are 
of the view that he should abdicate his position as chief and let the rightful 
successor Vaaltyn A, take over and conduct things as they have been in the 
past.215 
He is not the only person who shared the sentiment that chief Vaaltyn B should step 
down from the chieftainship. The majority of the people concurred that chieftainship in 
the area of Mokopane was in a better state at the time of Alfred’s rule and during the 
earlier times of regents such as Kojela. The crowd echoed the view that should chief 
Vaaltyn A takeover, things might go back to where they were during his ‘fathers’ 
chieftainship. It was apparent from the responses that the local residents were not in 
good terms with Vaaltyn B. A number of issues seemed to compromise chief Vaaltyn B’s 
relationship with the people of Mokopane. The villagers believed that his economic 
aspirations did not coincide with theirs. They are of the opinion that he looks after his 
own interest and the interests of his allies. Phago gave an example when she stated that:  
He has gone around installing two headmen per village. He installs headmen 
who are most likely to agree and collaborate with him. He does not support 
the headmen which he found installed when he came to power. 
Headmanship is hereditary, by the way, and so is chieftainship. We do not 
vote for a chief.216  
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Arguably the manner in which Vaaltyn B is said to have appointed his headmen 
resonates with the way in which he was appointed by the government.217 Personality, 
similar economic and political aspirations seem to have played a role in the formation 
and consolidation of his alliance with the government and the Platinum Reef Mine. The 
residents also said that his tendency to align himself with the government clouds his 
judgment because the economic and political deals he strikes with them and potential 
investors have detrimental impacts on communities.   
The alliance struck between the recognised chief, his tribal council and the local and 
provincial government can be described as a patron-client relationship. There was a 
consensus view that the latter refers to individuals or a group of people who occupy 
different social ranks and exchange goods, services, favours and rewards.218 The 
meaning of patrons and clients is often discussed separately. Patrons are construed as 
actors who hold higher authority as compared to clients. The latter are described as 
being on the receiving end, as in need of services.219 However, as Michael points out, 
patrons can become clients and vice versa and they possess different kinds of authority 
which can be of benefit to each. 220 
 In this case study the democratic local government is the ‘patron’ with access to various 
kinds of resources and distributive powers.  The mining houses and the chief are part of 
the networks.221 Each actor in this patronage network holds authority of a different 
kind. Thus It could be said in the case of Vaaltyn, that each actor in the patron-client 
relation is in possession of some kind of goods and services, favour and rewards to offer 
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and that this makes each actor equally important rather than one being classified as 
being on the receiving end. Eisenstadt and Roniger point out that often patron-client 
relations are fused by ‘a strong sense of solidarity that is couched in terms of 
interpersonal loyalty and attachments’. They argue that solidarity is often closely 
related ‘to conceptions of personal identity, especially of personal honour and 
obligation...’ 222 As a result those excluded from the patronage system – in this case ‘the 
people’ - are concerned that chief Vaaltyn B does not represent their interests but 
instead advances the interests of those he strikes deals with. 
Another dimension that adds to the tension between the people of Mokopane and Chief 
Vaaltyn B, is his remote style of leadership. A middle aged woman from one of the 
villages said: ‘Chief Vaaltyn is a distant chief. It’s as if when he came to power he was 
only told about the mines and not the communities.’223 Her analysis about the type of 
chief Vaaltyn B, coincides with that of the Vaaltyn A tribal council who emphasised the 
fact that Vaaltyn B’s residence in town in a house that  built by the mines, distanced him 
from the people.224 This made him inaccessible in a context where conventionally, the 
chief’s area of residence is close to his subjects.  Mr Molwase added his view that:  
L V Kekana is nothing. We take it as if he is renting. He was lucky to have 
been connected to some powerful members of the Kekana family thus he 
became a regent. He is not a chief. A chief is a chief of the people. He came 
here to divide the people of Mokopane. The war that you see, is a war 
against the mines. We are divided by him. He has a group that supports him. 
He owns shares in the mine. These are returns which he should trickle down 
to the people but instead he gets all the returns. The day he leaves to go back 
to where he comes from, he will leave a very wealthy man.225 
The Vaaltyn B tribal council revealed that the chief had a tribal office in Vaaltyn 
which he visited on Mondays, Wednesdays and Thursdays. The tribal council added 
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that people were aware of this office and often went there for assistance. The 
villagers confirmed his weekday visits. An old woman from the crowd said: 
His seasonal visits cannot yield the same effect as in a traditional case in 
which the chief resides in the village. Traditionally a chief stays in the 
village! The term, a chief is the chief of the people, describes a chief who 
acknowledges and serves his people. 
 Terrance Kekana echoed the same view during a community address when he said 
that: 
We would like to see people being hired in the same manner that they have 
been in the past. During the time of chief Alfred when you were unemployed 
people would say go to the chief house, he will find you a job. This is no 
longer the case. People get hired telephonically. 
This illustrates that traditionally, the chief’s homestead was perceived of necessity 
to be close to his subjects. This would allow for easy and direct access for his 
subjects.  Even though the institution had clearly defined rules and procedures, 
people seemed to point to the idea that bureaucracy and formality still permitted 
the people to access the chief more or less when they needed to. Since Vaaltyn B 
lived in town, there was no possibility for his subjects to knock on his doorstep 
with grievances.  
From the statements uttered by the members of the village and froM informants 
generally, it is obvious why Vaaltyn A is preferred by the villagers over the 
incumbent chief.  The fact that he resides within the community makes him an 
insider and promises to better communicate their needs. The community also 
believes that his ascent to power will return the structure of chieftainship to its 
traditional status and position as it was during his father’s rule. The need to go back 
to a previous style of chieftainship was driven by a general assumption among 
community members that chieftainship had become democratised post-1994. 226    
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The legitimacy of chieftainship in Vaaltyn and surrounding villages 
Legitimacy is a contested concept. It is intertwined with general notions of power, 
authority and compliance227. Max Weber described legitimacy as an understanding or 
justification for why people comply with a system of rule.228 He argued that a ‘system of 
authority attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its “legitimacy”’.229 Weber 
identifies three types of legitimate authority: rational legal authority ‘perceived as 
authority rested on a belief in the legality of normative rules and a right of those 
elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands’; traditional authority, which 
is ‘based on established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the 
legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them’; charismatic authority, 
which depended on the ‘devotion to specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism, or 
exemplary character of an individual person and of the normative patterns or order 
revealed or ordained by him’.230 In his work about the emergence of modernity in the 
West, Weber argues that traditional and charismatic authority is progressively replaced 
by rational-legal authority.231 Debatably, apart from other shortcomings, Weber’s 
limitation is that he discusses the different types of legitimacy as disconnected concepts. 
He does not demonstrate an understanding that these types of legitimacy are 
interlinked.   Moreover, his assertion that traditional and charismatic authority may be 
replaced by rational legal legitimacy assumes that there is no legality or rationality in 
traditional or charismatic authority. To some extant Max Weber’s shortcomings 
illustrate the Eurocentric232 narrowness and limitation of his concepts in the African 
contexts. The concepts he uses cannot be deployed to analyze traditional African 
institutions, systems, practices and beliefs.  
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David Beethams has argued along the same lines as Weber that ‘A given power 
relationship, is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy but because it can 
be justified in terms of their beliefs’.233 Barker attempted to simplify the complexity by 
offering a two-sided view when he proposed that legitimacy- ‘is both a belief held by 
subjects, or by some subjects, and a claim made by rulers’.234 Friedrich has also 
contributed to this concept when he argued that ‘the question of legitimacy is a question 
whether a given ruler-ship is believed to be based on good title by most men subject to 
it.’235 Within the same line of thinking, Lipset framed legitimacy as that which ‘involves 
the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the 
society’236; and Easton's, for whom legitimacy is ‘the conviction on the part of the 
member that it is right and proper... to accept and obey the authorities’.237 There is a 
conceptual difference between a normative and empirical approach over the meaning of 
legitimacy. Barker238 and Beetham239 have argued that ‘normative and the empirical 
approaches to legitimacy may have divergent purposes however should not be regarded 
as antithetical concepts.’240  
 
Tyler (1990) elucidates that ‘Political philosophers use the normative approach to 
identify standards by which a regime or action must be judged if it is to be regarded as 
legitimate. The normative approach would attempt to identify for instance why should a 
government be obeyed or why should citizens obey a government? Or under what 
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conditions is authority legitimate?’241 In contrast, an empirical approach to legitimacy in 
Tyler’s understanding is not concerned with normative standards. It seeks to explain 
‘why people obey a particular government or institution or why they revolt against it. 
The empirical approach is more concerned about whether the normative standards of 
people hold, however defined. It does not focus on what standards should hold.’242 This 
section engages with some of the ideas raised above. It probes people’s ideas about the 
legitimacy of chieftainship. It questions whether people continue to support the 
existence of chieftainship. Or whether they prefer the authority of local government. 
 
Barbara Oomen conducted a study about people’s perspectives on the legitimacy of 
traditional leadership in Sekhukhune. One of the questions she attempted to answer 
was how do people support chiefs? She showed in her findings that’s 80% of the people 
interviewed supported chiefs.243 She argues that the reasons why people support 
chieftainship are multifaceted. The majority of those who support the chief do so 
because they feel that chieftainship offers resources and services within a community. 
Support for a particular chief in Oomen’s perspective can be determined by the 
characteristics of a community and the personal characteristics of that chief. In 
Sekhukhune, for instance, she argues that chiefs are supported because they are 
perceived as closer to the people than elected local government leaders. Those who 
were interviewed for this study echoed the same sentiment that they did not support 
the current chief Vaaltyn B; however, they support the institution and an ideal of 
chieftainship because it is more accessible to the people than the local government.244   
Oomen shares the view that people’s perception or support for the institution of 
chieftaincy is influenced by the character of the individual chief. She writes that ‘those 
whose chief is performing well are most likely to also support traditional leadership 
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whereas those who are not gratified by the chief’s performance or character often do 
not support the institution.’245 Among those interviewed, a few do not support 
chieftainship because they are not content with Vaaltyn’s performance, his character 
and his style of leadership. However the majority continue to support chieftainship for 
cultural stated reasons.246   
The general consensus is that it is a particular form of chiefly rule that they are opposed 
to and not necessarily the chieftainship institution itself. Citing Ribot247, Francis B. 
Nyamnjoh248 states on his paper on chieftainship in Botswana, that although the 
presumed representivity and accountability of chiefs to their populations have been 
questioned, this does not seem to have affected the political importance of chiefs in a 
significant way. While majority of the interviewed villagers, support chieftainship for 
cultural and identity reasons, others support chieftainship because it is seen to some 
extent as an alternative form of governance. Very few expressed abhorrence of 
chieftainship. One old man from one of the villages angrily expressed his opposition to 
chiefs: ‘Support my foot! These chiefs are thieves! They do as they please. We don’t 
support anyone!’249An old woman had much the same to view: ‘Aww no! No! No! We are 
not happy with chiefs. It was better back then. They all work for their homes! (A chorus 
joined in agreement). They don’t care about us. Our children are unemployed’.250 
There were some shared views among those villagers who do not support chieftainship 
that chiefs are inaccessible, corrupt, not accountable, pursue their own interest, and 
they tend to align themselves with the ‘much more corrupt’ democratic state. It became 
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apparent that the succession dispute shaped some villagers choice not to support 
chieftainship. However, the majority of the people who were interviewed responded 
positively about the existence of chieftainship. Tshepo Maponya for instance said that:  
‘Chieftainship is our culture. It is where we come from. For us to grow as old 
as we have is because of chiefs and headman. Normally, chiefs work 
according to our culture and the African culture. Their responsibilities are 
totally different from that of the municipality. But at the moment if you 
asked me, I would say that our chiefs are failing us.’251 
 
Tshepo Maponya’s view that chieftainship forms part of his identity and culture 
resonates with the majority of people’s reasons for why they support the institution 
of traditional leadership. Most respondents saw a chief as the custodian of culture 
and identity. Both culture and identity are comprehended as essential for 
‘grounding’. The latter is interpreted as self mastery- being aware of one’s historical 
and cultural roots in a rapidly changing universe. It could be argued that among the 
reasons as to why Vaaltyn B is not supported is because he does not seem to share 
the villagers’ sentiments about culture and identity. 252  
 
Andries Matshotshwane mentioned that he supports chieftainship. However, his 
reasons were slightly different from others when he said: 
Chieftainship should continue to exist. Without chiefs we cannot succeed in 
instances where we have to deal with mines.  If the mines could only come 
through local government, then it would be worse. When the government 
has taken a decision then it is final but chiefs and headman are usually 
accessible and open to suggestions.253 
 
Others concurred that it is much more effective when the chief is involved in mining 
deals.  This is because the chief has his own networks in the village. The kinds of 
deals that are struck by the chief and his networks have potential for being 
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disclosed by one or two people. This makes it easier for the people outside of these 
social networks, ‘the villagers’ to get an understanding of what is going on around 
their communities. In essence those who support the chief do so for the reason 
similar to those expressed by Andries Matshotshwane, that chiefs are more 
accessible.  Moreover it is believed that it is possible to confront or overturn 
decisions that are taken by the chief but not the case with those taken by the 
government. The rationale behind their reasoning was that it is often not clear who 
or at which office to confront local government. In cases where it is clear who 
should be confronted, the bureaucratic procedures make it difficult to confront 
those responsible. This raises some theoretical and practical questions about 
participative democracy.254     
 
Phago raised another case when she said that:  
Chieftainship is good to safeguard culture. It is also good in rural areas where 
majority are unemployed and uneducated. Parents hardly have money to pay for 
school fees, water and electricity. However, if it were the municipality which was 
directly in involved we would have problems because they privatise services. It 
is now worse with this rotten ANC. However, the existence of chiefs makes it 
possible to stay in areas for free.255 
 
The point which Anna Phago raises is that chiefs are considerate of the social and 
economic status of people. Vaaltyn and its surroundings are areas that have been 
deeply affected by the privatisation of water and electricity during the process of 
demarcation.256 What seems to have been a major concern for those interviewed 
had been incorporation of villages that could not afford the rates and meter reading 
with more affluent areas. The faction now in support of Vaaltyn A, stood against 
this incorporation for the above reason and also because incorporation entailed 
that some parts of the land that was declared as belonging to the Ndebele tribe 
would be appropriated by the government. 
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In light of the consensus among the interviewed villagers that Vaaltyn A should take 
over as chief and that they were not against chieftainship as an institution but rather a 
particular chief and his style of rule, it seemed necessarily to probe the relationship that 
the villagers had with local government. Every informant had some negative 
perceptions about the local government. The general perception was that government 
officials are corrupt. The villagers complained about not knowing who the officials were. 
One old man gave an example that: ‘It has been 10 to 15 years since Ngoako Ramathlodi 
has been in power but if you asked people if they have seen his face before- they would 
say no’.257 Service delivery was of concern. Unemployment and lack of education added 
to the grievances of those interviewed.   
It was obvious during the interviews that there was a lack of understanding about what 
local government was and what its responsibilities were. This majority spoke of local 
government as responsible for delivery of services and the creation of jobs and building 
of schools.  The villagers employ the word ‘government’ in a manner that does not make 
a distinction between local, provincial and national government. This perhaps has to do 
with the fact that failure at any level of a democratic institution within these villages is 
comprehended as a failure of the government.   
 
David Marupe holds the perception that:  
Things were running accordingly. The only problem which is also 
responsible for development in Mokopane is the mine. Mining changed 
everything, completely. The mines penetrated the very same chiefs who 
were our alternative government.258 
 
The majority were of the view that chieftainship was at some point very effective 
and thus was an alternative to local government. One old man recalled that with 
time ‘chiefs started to work in a democratic manner. Chief are now the ANC. They 
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are unable to rule. Now as you see we are in conflict. Chiefs are involved in mines 
and they fail to rule people. So does the municipality.’259 The patronage network 
that the local government, chief and the mines have created, had developed to a 
point where they had failed to make a clear distinction between each faction with 
regards to their responsibility. J. Michael Williams in his study about democratic 
consolidation in Mvuzane Tribal Authority in Kwazulu Natal observes that the 
institution of chieftainship had ‘chiefed’ the process of democratisation and while 
the democratic institution had incorporated chieftainship. He observes that 
chieftaincy and democratic local institutions ‘blend together in complex ways’. He 
concludes that this make it difficult for people to choose between chieftainship and 
local government. 260  
 
The Mogalakwena local government officials, the mayor of Mogalakwena municipality, 
the councillor of Vaaltyn and the councillors of areas around Vaaltyn had positive views 
about chiefs and the manner in which Mr Mmola, the former Mayor of Mogalakwena, 
engaged with them.  During one of the interviews the question about how traditional 
leaders in the area of Mokopane engaged with local municipal government of 
Mokopane, the former mayor Mmola’s response was that: ‘that is why I had invited you 
to joins us in Bakenberg. It would have helped you to witness how ‘we can be a good 
model across municipalities’.261 He claimed that: ‘we have a good relationship with 
traditional leaders in the area because we engage with them.’262   
Councillor Kekana said that:  
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When dealing with chiefs, you must go to them, you must not say they must not 
come to you. You as a politician you must go to them, you see, you must. That’s 
how we manage risk, everybody counts, that is why we involve everyone, you 
see now, I think we work well in that regard.263 
Mr Mmola had emphasised that during his early days in office there were tensions 
between municipal councillors and chiefs. However, he mentioned that these 
tensions ended once he began realising the importance of negotiating with 
traditional leaders. He has boastfully stated each time I had asked him about his 
relationship with traditional leaders, that he has the most pleasant and efficient 
relationship with traditional leaders and that Mogalakwena municipality could be 
used as a model for this reason.      
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has explored people’s perceptions about the succession dispute, whether 
they were conscious about the dynamics of this dispute and the impact that it had on 
them.  It explored whether people still supported the institution of chieftainship and the 
reasons behind their support. It became apparent during the interviews that those 
interviewed were aware of the dispute even though not everyone understood its cause. 
The majority were of the view that Vaaltyn B should step down and let the rightful chief, 
Vaaltyn A, take over as chief.  There was a shared assumption that as chief, Vaaltyn A 
would restore the institution of chieftainship to its ‘previous form’. Vaaltyn B is not 
supported because the community believes that his administration is corrupt, his 
leadership style is distant, and he is perceived more like an outsider since his 
homestead is not in the area of Vaaltyn or surrounding villages.  He is also blamed for 
the manner in which the mine has conducted itself in the area of Mokopane. By contrast 
Vaaltyn A is perceived as bringing hope in the villages. They believe that as he resides 
with them and speaks the same language, that he would be more likely to have the same 
economic aspirations as they did.  
Generally the dispute has impacted negatively on the villages of Mokopane. People do 
not know who to consult in cases of grievances.  The relationship between them and 
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local government has been further tainted by the mining houses. They feel helpless 
because the incumbent chief, his headman and the local government and the mines are 
interlinked within a patronage system which keeps them loyal and accountable to each 
other instead of being accountable to the people. I have argued that the patron in this 
case is the local government of Mokopane and that the chief and mines are patrons who 
are not necessarily at the receiving end but hold some goods, services, favours and 
rewards which allows them to play a role in the formation and consolidation of their 
patron-client relationship.  
The dispute has created a platform that divides the community and chief Vaaltyn A and 
his tribal council from political and economically binding decisions. On the other hand it 
has allowed for the creation and consolidation of a patronage system. Some of the 
people interviewed have therefore decided against the continuation of chieftainship. 
The majority of those interviewed however made it clear that it was not the institution 
of chieftainship which they are against but chief Vaaltyn B. They continued to support 
chieftainship because chiefs are custodians of their culture and identity. They are more 
accessible as compared to the local government. They mentioned that their decision can 
be overturned if needs be. Although the interviews carried out for this study may not 
necessarily be enough to conclude whether people in Vaaltyn or Mokopane as a whole 
continues to support chieftainship,  the interviews  highlights that there are those who 
still support the institution for various reasons. Further studies need to engage with the 
issue of support, if at all for traditional leadership and the reasons behind. 
The findings raise a number of questions which will be discussed in detail in the 
conclusion. Scholars tend to criticize the idea of the institution of chieftainship existing 
alongside a democratic government, with the assertion that chieftainship is 
undemocratic. In the conclusion I engage with the concept of participatory democracy, 
its strength and limits. The conclusion argues that embracing principles of democracy is 
no guarantee that people will not be excluded from politically binding decisions. The 
very argument that scholars use to criticize the existence of traditional leaders can be 
used to criticize the democratic government as well. The point is that we may need to 
understand the context in each case before it can be concluded that chieftaincy should 
be overthrown as some scholars have suggested.  
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Chapter 6  
Conclusion 
Scholarly ideas about the existence of chieftainship within the democratic 
dispensation 
The existence of chiefs alongside democracy has raised contested and prolonged 
arguments among scholars. Traditional leaders continue to be recognised by the South 
African government and the Constitution. This is irrespective of the fact that prior to 
democracy, chiefs were deemed to be ‘puppets’ of the colonial and the apartheid 
state.264 This section concludes by looking at some of the critical debates that have been 
raised in the work that has been published with regards to the subject of traditional 
leaders and democracy.  
Arguably, there are at least three dimensions to the debate about the coexistence of 
chieftainship within democratic institutions. The first dimension is presented by 
scholars who contend that chieftainship should not be given recognition within a 
democratic system, because it undermines the democratic values and principles 
espoused in the South African Constitution.265 The second dimension is presented by 
scholars who believe that certain aspects of the traditional principles are not as 
contradictory to democratic principles as conventionally comprehended. They are of 
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the view that traditional leaders can coexist with democratic institutions. These 
scholars also assert that chieftainship can enhance democracy, as chiefs in some cases 
influence the vote of their constituencies.266 The third facet neither supports nor 
dismisses the coexistence of traditional leaders within democratic dispensations. These 
scholars hold the view that whichever system that is functional among people should be 
studied and explained, in order to understand whether and how that particular system 
operates and is efficient.   
The study that stands out with regards to the first dimension is Ntsebeza’s, in which he 
explores traditional leadership and its relation to land in the context of democracy 
through a case study of Xhalanga Eastern Cape. In his book, he looks at two questions 
about the survival of traditional leaders into the post-colonial and apartheid era and 
how traditional leaders obtain their authority and legitimacy. In order to answer the 
question about the survival of traditional leaders, Ntsebeza focuses on the land question 
and suggests that it is important to understand how traditional leaders have survived. 
He investigates the legitimacy of traditional leaders through the tensions and the 
implications that resulted from the 1996 South African Constitution and both the 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework and the Communal Land Rights Act.  
Drawing on Mamdani’s analysis of decentralized despotism267, Ntsebeza maintains that 
‘the powers that traditional leaders possessed during the colonial and the apartheid era 
forced communities to abide by tyrannical chiefs, otherwise they would stand little 
chance to acquire land’. 268 As a result he argues that ‘traditional leadership throughout 
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its existence has been dependent on the state for survival and that chiefs derived their 
authority from being involved in the land allocation process rather than support from 
their subjects’.269 In the case of Xhalanga Ntsebeza argues that land issues such as ‘the 
struggle of landholders against the apartheid’s engineered ‘re-tribalisation’ gave 
traditional leadership in this area a specific trajectory.’270  He observes that in Xhalanga 
traditional leaders failed to establish themselves among their subjects and that their 
authority survived because of their role in the land allocation process and not 
necessarily because of popular support. Ntsebeza points out that throughout the history 
of Xhalanga, traditional leaders had a complicated and ambivalent relationship with 
their subjects.  
Additionally, he argues that the ability of people to choose their own leaders is central 
to the concept of liberal democracy. He looks at democracy in both its participatory and 
representative forms to argue that both are crucial aspects in a democratic system.271 
For the reasons above, and that ‘chiefs are not elected’ and uphold principles that are 
contradictory to democracy, Ntsebeza argues against the continuance of chieftainship in 
a democratic dispensation. 
Ntsebeza’s argument that traditional leaders have been dependent on the state for 
survival is relevant to the argument taken in this thesis. The local and provincial 
government of Mokopane legitimised the current chief Vaaltyn B. This was done 
irrespective of the fact that the tribal council of Vaaltyn A and villagers regard Vaaltyn B 
as illegitimate. The chance of survival for the unrecognised tribal faction in the long run, 
is questionable. Although their candidate, Vaaltyn A is considered by the people as the 
rightful heir, the fact that their claim was dismissed by the local and provincial 
government denies them the possession of political and economic resources that 
maintains the legitimacy of a chief.  
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Even so, Ntsebeza’s suggestion to do away with chiefs is overstated. His argument is 
proposed from a case study in which traditional leaders have never been favoured by 
people. His study cannot be generalised as it is inapplicable for instance, to areas such 
as Sekhukhune (Limpopo) where chieftainship has been supported for a long period of 
time for various reasons.272 In Sekhukhune chiefs did not so much collaborate with the 
colonial and apartheid government but formed part of the broader national liberation 
struggle to overthrow the colonial and the apartheid government.273  
Ntsebeza’s use of democracy in his study is too narrow. There has been no consensus 
about the meaning of democracy. However, there has been an agreement about what 
constitutes democracy. These elements vary from freedom, equality, and justice, the 
right to vote and to representation and to majority rule. Pennock (1979) states that the 
component of representative democracy is the ability of people to elect the leader 
whom they believe would take action on their behalf. He explains that ‘elections are 
thought to constitute the great sanction for assuring representative behavior…’274 
Arguably, there is a normative assumption among scholars who contend against the 
existence of chieftainship on grounds of their hereditary status, that election of 
government officials gives way to representation and therefore accountability. There is 
a gap in principle and in the practice of representative and participative democracy. 
There have been major service delivery protests across South Africa in the previous 
years and currently.275 Most of them were about access to resources, unaccountable, 
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distant and corrupt leaders. The frustration was that although people voted during 
national and local elections, there were no major improvements in their standards of 
living.  The same frustration could be deduced from the interviews in Vaaltyn and 
surrounding areas. People articulated grievances about not knowing who the actual 
government representatives were, of their being corrupt and of not knowing whom to 
approach for complaints.276 Even though the residents of Mokopane had problems with 
the current chief they believed that conventionally a chief is more accessible as he 
resides within the community. Thornton encounters similar sentiments in his case 
study of traditional leadership in a Swazi chiefdom in Barberton, Mpumalanga. 
Thornton states that ‘even if chiefs are unable, or fail to provide services, they 
nonetheless often earn respect simply because they are resident and share the miseries 
of poverty, in contrast to the politicians who are notorious for only making appearances 
at election times.’277 Additionally, in Vaaltyn participants continually suggested that 
decisions taken by chiefs could ‘potentially’ be reversed as opposed to decisions taken 
by the democratic government. They believed that traditionally, they could knock at the 
chief’s door with grievances about a certain decision as compared to the government in 
which they would have to deal with the bureaucratic system. This shows that even 
though voting is an important component of democracy it is not assurance for 
representation or participation in binding decisions in a democracy.  
In her study about people’s perceptions on traditional leadership in Sekukhune- 
Limpopo, Oomen illustrates that ‘-80 percent of the 607 questionnaires on traditional 
leadership, land, local government and customary law in Sekhukhune, were in support 
of traditional leadership.’278 Their reasons for the support of chieftainship as in Vaaltyn, 
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ranged from traditional leaders being an alternative to the inaccessible, corrupt and not 
so deeply entrenched local government in the areas of Sekhukhune. The same study 
elucidates that chiefs would give financial and personal support to women whose 
husbands would be working in mines and did not send a share of their wages back 
home. This is contrary to Ntsebeza’s argument that traditional leaders are oppressive to 
women’s rights and should therefore be dispensed with. 
 
It is not this thesis’ objective to defend the existence of chieftainship alongside 
democracy. This thesis illustrates the need to comprehend in each case, which chiefs 
remain legitimate and why they do so. This thesis sheds some light on people’s ideas 
about the institution of chieftainship and how they understand and experience 
democracy. Williams points out that it is ‘incorrect to assume that people will 
necessarily choose between chieftaincy and democratic institutions, as these 
institutions are blending together in complex ways.’279 In chapter 1, I have shown that 
Vaaltyn B’s personality, background, tribal council and social setting played a role, 
among other reasons such as his father’s (Molalakgori) long standing relationship with 
the commissioner and then the TLC, to award him authority. I have shown in chapter 3 
and 4 patron client agreements that occur between the local, provincial government, 
mining houses and the current chief Vaaltyn B. In addition, I have shown how those who 
are excluded, such as the unrecognized chief Vaaltyn A, his tribal council and the 
communities recount the manner in which these political and economic ties between 
Vaaltyn B, the Platinum Reef mine and the local and provincial government affect them. 
These in turn shapes people perceptions about how they view chieftainship and local 
government. The majority of the participants did not support the current chief Vaaltyn 
B because he is said to be absorbed by aspirations and tendencies of corrupt 
government officials. Instead, they support Vaaltyn A, who arguably seems also to be the 
legitimate candidate for the position of regency even though he is not recognised by the 
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government. Chapter 5 also illustrated that even though the participants in this study 
support Vaaltyn B, they support the continuing existence of chieftainship.  They support 
chieftainship for cultural and identity reasons and for the view that traditionally, a chief 
is closer to the people compared to the local government officials. However, this does 
not mean that they dismiss the existence of local governance. It could be deduced from 
the interviews that people simply support the legitimacy of any institution which 
promises to serve their needs. The findings in this study may not be a general reflection 
of the whole population of Vaaltyn or Mokopane but they illuminate that people in 
certain areas still support the existence of chieftainship. Thus there needs to be more 
intensive research focus dedicated to understand the support for traditional leadership 
in a democratic dispensation. 
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